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Water scarcity is a critical problem facing the Middle East, more so than any 
other region of the world. Countries in the area have devoted vast amounts of resources to 
coping with the decreasing availability of water. Methods from cloud seeding to 
underground pipelines of desalinated water from the sea are prevalent in government 
discussions on the issue. These projects have had marginal impacts due to the massive 
humanitarian crisis caused by the Syrian civil war. With Syrians migrating to other 
Middle Eastern countries by the millions, the water-stressed states of the region cannot 
cope with the additional demand on their fragile and failing hydrological systems.  
This thesis examines Lebanon and Jordan as comparative case studies to explore 
the effects of Syrian refugees on the water supplies of each country as a non-traditional 
security threat. Political stability is the ultimate goal of each state; however, the effects of 
millions of refugees on available water has a significant impact on civil society and the 
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The issue of water in the Middle East has been the subject of much study and 
debate in recent years. As the most water-poor region in the world, it suffers from less 
consistent rainfall and the least amount of available groundwater than any other area on 
the planet.1 Despite the apparent lack of resources, the region has continued to show 
economic expansion and population growth. This growth has largely resulted from the 
over exploitation of resources, inefficient policies, and poor water usage practices, which 
are all magnified by the sudden influx of Syrian refugees into Middle Eastern water 
stressed states. Thus, the availability of water has rapidly become a significant non-
traditional threat in Jordan and Lebanon because they are the most demographically 
burdened states hosting refugees. 
The conflict in Syria has created one of the worst humanitarian disasters in recent 
history. According to the Mercy Corps, more than 11,000,000 people have been displaced 
as a result of the violence started in 2011.2 Of those 11,000,000 Syrians, an estimated 
2,000,000 have been absorbed by Lebanon and Jordan, and this has placed immeasurable 
strain on the ability of the states to provide water to refugees and citizens alike.3 Though 
recognizing the daunting task Lebanon and Jordan face to provide for massive numbers 
of Syrian refugees, effective water management policy still eludes those states and 
inefficient water usage practices remain the status quo. 
The inability of Lebanon and Jordan to address water scarcity and the impact of 
the Syrian refugees on their resources pose a significant threat to the legitimacy and 
stability of states and the greater region. The opportunity for private actors to replace the 
state in facilitating the basic needs of citizens, often for great personal profit, has the 
                                                 
1 Growing Blue, “The Growing Blue Tool,” accessed October 12, 2015, http://growingblue.com/the-
growing-blue-tool/. 





potential to turn to dissatisfaction with the government and political unrest. Addressing 
this issue responsibly will secure water for the people residing in Lebanon and Jordan and 
avoid a potentially disastrous non-traditional security threat. Non-traditional security 
threats are defined as those threats to national security that do not stem from a military or 
interstate competition or balance of power, often long-term in consequences, difficult to 
reverse, and transnational.4 Examples include scarcity of resources, the spread of 
infectious disease, transnational crime, ethnic conflict, and environmental degradation. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review focuses on water scarcity in the Middle East and the 
potential impact that Syrian refugees are having on neighboring Jordan and Lebanon, 
particularly as a non-traditional security threat. First, the review underscores the nature of 
the water shortage throughout the entire region by examining the environmental causes of 
the expanding crisis. Next, literature on international and domestic structures impacting 
the water crisis are examined. Furthermore, the influx of Syrian refugees into Lebanon 
and Jordan is addressed in light of the potential threats to the state regarding water. 
Finally, the linkages between the effects of refugees on water availability as a non-
traditional security threat is the basis for the remainder of the thesis.  
1. Environmental Factors and State Responses 
The uncertainty of data is a key problem when analyzing literature regarding the 
availability of water throughout the Middle East. The lack of accurate and consistent data 
may be due to several different reasons. For instance, accounting for water in the region 
is a highly politicized endeavor resulting in divergent views and a lack of consensus on 
usage and availability numbers reported by states and organizations. This is particularly 
evident in reports made by upstream and downstream riparian states when lobbying to 
undertake projects on shared water resources. States wish to present the data in such a 
way that allows them to draw the most on available resources, which precipitates over 
                                                 
4 Yizhou Wang, Defining Non-traditional Security and Its Implications for China (Beijing: Institute of 
World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 2004), 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.472.3779&rep=rep1&type=pdf.   
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reporting of neighborly usage while underreporting domestic withdrawal of shared 
resources. Also, there is a lack of consistent historical data since studying the 
hydrography of the region is a relatively new priority. This is largely a result of 
underfunding and a lack of political interest to determine the severity of the water crisis.5 
Despite this uncertainty, generalizations can be drawn regardless of the inconsistencies in 
reporting.  
The Middle East suffers from some of the most unpredictable and scarce rainfall 
as well as being home to some of the most arid regions in the world.6 Every country in 
the region, aside from Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, falls below the water scarcity threshold of 
1000m
3
/person/year as established by the United Nations (UN).7 Since water is so scarce 
throughout the region, Middle Easterners, particularly in Jordan because of decades old 
water rationing practices, are some of the most frugal water users in the world.8 
However, the frugality of the people will not be enough to compensate for the rapid 
population growth, which is projected to double in size in the next 25 years.9 This 
population growth will put an increased strain on the available water resources and will 
make it exceedingly difficult for states in the region to cope. States will need to ensure 
their water supply to feed their burgeoning populations and expand their economies. As it 
becomes clearer that the hydrological system cannot meet the demands of population 
growth, riparian disputes and internal politics will play a major role in the development 
of a long-term sustainable solution to provide water to the people of the Middle East.10  
                                                 
5 Greg Shapland, Rivers of Discord (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 4. 
6 Peter Rogers and Peter Lydon, “Preface,” in Water in the Arab World: Perspectives and Prognoses, 
ed. Peter Rogers and Peter Lydon (Cambridge, MA: The Division of Applied Sciences, Harvard University, 
1994), vii.    
7 Afreen Siddiqi and Laura Diaz Anadon, “The Water-Energy Nexus in Middle East and North 
Africa,” Energy Policy 39, no. 8 (2011): 4532, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article 
/pii/S0301421511003065.  
8 Mercy Corps, Tapped Out: Water Scarcity and Refugee Pressures in Jordan (Portland, OR: Mercy 
Corps, 2014), https://www.mercycorps.org/research-resources/tapped-out-water-scarcity-and-refugee-
pressures-jordan, 4. 
9 Shapland, Rivers of Discord, 3. 
10 John A. Allan and Tony Allan, The Middle East Water Question: Hydropolitics and the Global 
Economy (London: I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2001), 10.  
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To combat the shortage of water caused by nature, many countries in the region 
have devoted large amounts of money to harnessing available resources. Unfortunately, 
what water is available is becoming more difficult to extract.11 The three predominant 
methods that have been used to increase the availability of water are damming surface 
water, pumping groundwater reserves, and desalinating seawater.12 Surface water 
includes rivers and lakes that are recharged through seasonal rainfall, while groundwater 
consists of underground aquifers that slowly recharge over time with consistent 
precipitation.13  
These projects, though designed to alleviate water shortages, rarely have a 
meaningful impact on the well-being of the population for several reasons. Greg 
Shapland argues that dams can take more than a decade to make any significant 
contribution to the water supply of a state and are often the subject of lengthy 
negotiations between all riparian states, further delaying projects and desired outputs.14 
Pumping groundwater can often lead to border disputes between states that rely on the 
same aquifers for sustenance. Furthermore, the cost of desalination is prohibitive to many 
countries because of their distance from seawater, which significantly decreases the 
viability of this technology to help the majority of water-poor countries in the Middle 
East.15 
In addition to fierce competition for existing potable water supplies, states are 
facing a marked decrease in the quality of available water, further exacerbating the 
scarcity of water and the ability of states to provide fresh water to their constituents. As 
expected, it is the most water-poor states that are facing the greatest challenge from the 
rapidly decreasing water quality. Several countries in the Middle East, including Syria, 
Jordan, and Israel, are facing severe degradations in the quality of water they are able to 
                                                 
11 Abdul-Karim Sadik and Shawki Barghouti, “Water Problems of the Arab World: Management of 
Scarce Resources,” in Water in the Arab World: Perspectives and Prognoses, eds. Peter Rogers and Peter 
Lydon (Cambridge, MA: The Division of Applied Sciences, Harvard University, 1994), 1.  
12 Shapland, Rivers of Discord, 3. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid.  
15 Ibid., 3, 12.  
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extract from groundwater sources. Traditionally, Lebanon has been viewed as a water 
rich state, but inefficient water management and infrastructure, combined with population 
increases, including refugees, makes Lebanon a water-poor state, as well. Some see this 
as the direct result of over exploitation of groundwater reserves in conjunction with 
seawater and brine intrusion into groundwater aquifers. As the total amount of available 
water decreases, contaminants become increasingly concentrated in the remaining 
freshwater, making this a persistent and growing problem for states to overcome.16  
2. Significance to the State and Potential Threats 
Literature regarding water as a resource to the state and its possible security 
implications generally separates possible threats into two categories: international and 
domestic threats. John A. Allan suggests that conflicts between states have occurred in 
the past that have resulted in large amounts of natural water supplies changing hands; 
however, in today’s international political climate, cooperation is much more profitable 
for riparian states, which are those that border sources of groundwater.17 The most recent 
example of this is Israel pursuing increased desalinization to manufacture water simply 
because it is easier to make and sell water when compared to lengthy negotiations with 
other states, often Jordan.18 International competition will continue primarily through 
political posturing; however, states’ international water policies will actually support 
cooperation.19 The literature suggests domestic interests regarding water allocation will 
breed internal competition and increase the chances of conflict within state borders.20  
To comprehend the water shortage issue in the Middle East, several factors at the 
international level require critical examination. Almost all states in the region share 
                                                 
16 Avner Vengosh and Eliahu Rosenthal, “Saline Groundwater in Israel: Its Bearing on the Water 
Crisis in the Country,” Journal of Hydrology 156, no. 1 (1994): 393, 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0022169494900876.   
17 John A. Allan, “Hydro-peace in the Middle East: Why No Water Wars?: A Case Study of the Jordan 
River Basin,” SAIS Review 22, no. 2 (2002): 257, 
https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v022/22.2allan.html.   
18 Ibid., 269. 
19 Allan, “Hydro-peace in the Middle East,” 255. 
20 Shapland, Rivers of Discord, 3. 
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groundwater sources in some fashion, and they are also equally exposed to the effects of 
over extraction and contamination.21 This alone transforms aspirations for water security 
by one state into an international matter that can have far-reaching consequences for 
other states. Due to this connection between riparian states, Joyce Starr writes, “Water 
security will soon rank with military security in the war rooms of defense ministries.”22 
Yet, despite the increasing emphasis placed on securing water by Middle Eastern states in 
recent decades, a major conflict has not broken out yet as a direct result of water security, 
primarily because of international structures.  
A prominent structure that supports riparian cooperation, suggested by J. A. 
Allan, is the global food trade because it allows water-poor states the opportunity to 
continue their inefficient strategies for water usage. It is through the structure of a global 
economy that states with little or no renewable water are able to maintain the façade of 
meeting their water requirements while exposing themselves to minimal political risk. 
Furthermore, Allan argues that many policies implemented between states are created on 
biased views that deliberately skew the facts, yet allow for agreements to be reached 
simply to gain political favor and to provide sound bites for domestic consumption. It is 
precisely this effort to maintain domestic favor by not disrupting the current system that 
prevents serious reform in water usage and sharing at the international level.23  
Another factor that contributes to maintaining the status quo on the international 
level, despite the known shortage of water resources, is deliberate ambiguity in water 
agreements.24 Itay Fischhendler points out several instances throughout the world, from 
the Ganges River in India to the Jordan River Valley, where treaties have been signed 
that do not make any substantial progress toward more equitable sharing of resources, but 
are vague to the point that each riparian can deliver a victory to its domestic audience.25 
Fischhendler asserts the causes of ambiguity regarding water are “non-excludability, 
                                                 
21 Joyce R. Starr, “Water Wars,” Foreign Policy, no. 82 (Spring 1991): 19, doi: 10.2307/1148639.   
22 Ibid. 
23 Allan, “Hydro-peace in the Middle East,” 257–258.  
24 Itay Fischhendler, “Ambiguity in Transboundary Environmental Dispute Resolution: The Israeli—
Jordanian Water Agreement,” Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 1 (2008): 92.   
25 Ibid., 93. 
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rivalry, trans-boundary factors, and the erratic nature of the availability and demand of 
the resource.”26 It is clear to see that all of Fischhendler’s causes for ambiguity hint at 
riparian states having a lack of political will to tackle the issue at the international level. 
These assertions, in line with those of J. A. Allen, support the norm of cooperation 
between states that share water resources despite no significant progress addressing the 
crisis of managing the supply and demand of water.  
Water, to a large extent, is the foundation of economic prosperity, and thus, its 
decreasing availability represents a significant problem for the Middle Eastern states.
27
 
Governments in the Middle East are very aware of the importance of water for economic 
and social development, but competing domestic interests are a crucial factor in 
determining how available water is obtained and eventually allocated. Powerful 
agriculture lobbies have done a lot of work in securing their usage of water and have 
become the largest freshwater consumers in water stressed countries in the Middle East.28 
This majority usage is due to two main reasons: the significant impact of agriculture on 
local economies through employment, and states attempting to reach a level of food 
security by growing food domestically.29 
The dominance of the agricultural sector in the usage of water presents several 
challenges for states to overcome. As economic development continues within water-
poor states, municipal usage is expected to increase with the demands for a higher quality 
of life. More demand on the inadequate water delivery infrastructure coupled with 
stagnant or decreasing supply represents a risk to the states. Domestic competition for 
water resources has the potential to cause dissatisfaction between civil society and the 
political elites with interests in the agricultural sector.30  
                                                 
26 Ibid., 104. 
27 Rogers and Lydon, “Preface;” May A. Massoud et al., “The Challenges of Sustainable Access to 
Safe Drinking Water in Rural Areas of Developing Countries: Case of Zawtar El-Charkieh, Southern 
Lebanon,” Journal of Environmental Health 72 (10): 24.   
28 Allan, “Hydro-peace in the Middle East,” 257. 
29 Shapland, Rivers of Discord, 3. 
30 Amanda Silverman, “Global Thinkers: Why Water Is a Fundamental National Security Issue,” 
Global Thinkers, Foreign Policy Online, November 3, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/03/global-
thinkers-why-water-is-a-fundamental-national-security-issue/.  
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Another domestic issue that the literature acknowledges is the inadequacy of 
water delivery infrastructure and the possible implications that accompany the failure of 
the state to meet basic needs. In many cases, particularly in Jordan, Lebanon, and Israel, 
when water is delivered by state-run infrastructure, the supply is intermittent when 
available or undrinkable because of contamination or salinization.31 This is reflected in 
the region having the highest costs of water availability per capita in the world, dating 
back to 1985.32 The high cost per capita is a direct result of private enterprise taking the 
place of the state in delivering basic goods, and this has the potential for increasing 
delegitimization of the state and state-run services. 
3. Water and Refugees in Lebanon 
The issues regarding water quality and availability in Lebanon have begun to take 
on a new level of significance given the Syrian refugee crisis. As more attention is given 
to the plight of the refugees, the standard rhetoric of the Lebanese government claiming a 
surplus of water resources has started to come under more scrutiny in both academia and 
the media. New reports and articles have begun to surface that directly contradict 
statements made by the government regarding the quality and availability of water to 
citizens and refugees alike.33  
Recent claims have been made by the Lebanese government suggesting that in the 
near future Lebanon would be experiencing a water surplus of some 500 million cubic 
meters, but these estimates do not take into account many important factors that 
drastically reduce the amount of water that is actually available in the state.34 It is 
estimated that human actions have decreased the availability of water from some sources 
by as much as 29 percent, as can be seen in increasing desertification throughout the 
                                                 
31 Vengosh and Rosenthal, Saline Groundwater in Israel, 389;  
T. Darwish et al., “Salinity Evolution and Crop Response to Secondary Soil Salinity in Two Agro-
climatic Zones in Lebanon,” Agricultural Water Management 78, no. 1 (2005): 152, 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378377405002337152.    
32 Starr, “Water Wars,” 18. 
33 Kamel Saleh, “Lebanon Faces Water Crisis,” Al-Monitor, March 30, 2014, http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/03/lebanon-water-poverty-line-crisis.html#.  
34 Ibid.  
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country.35 Furthermore, as the growing population continues to draw on a resource with a 
finite supply, the amount of water that is available per individual will continue to 
decrease. Additionally, water wastage, pollution, evaporation, and drought all negatively 
impact reliable water delivery to the populace.36 All of these factors combined with 
unreliable seasonal rainfall suggest Lebanon is facing a water shortage that state 
resources cannot offset.  
Shortcomings with the water quality and availability are not only the effect of a 
growing Lebanese population but are also exacerbated by the 1,100,000 Syrian refugees 
who have fled civil war by migrating to Lebanon.37 The quality of water in areas with 
large numbers of new refugees has declined to the point of being referred to as “hell 
water” to the detriment of refugees and citizens alike.38 Poor water management practices 
and significantly increased demand expedite the loss of the availability of quality 
drinking water, leading most refugees to live on two gallons of clean water a day 
indefinitely, which must be shipped in by outside providers.39  
It is reasonable to expect that the increased stress placed upon water resources 
along with declining quality and availability have the potential to destabilize the central 
government of Lebanon. With ever-increasing numbers of refugees flowing over the 
border, the state’s ability to provide basic goods to its citizens and those seeking refuge 
will continue to deteriorate. This in turn will increase the chances for strife and 
destabilization in communities throughout Lebanon.  
4. Water and Refugees in Jordan 
As they have to Lebanon, Syrian refugees have also fled to Jordan to seek safety 
from the brutal conflict that has engulfed their state. An estimated 600,000 Syrians have 
                                                 
35 Amin Shaban, “Indicators and Aspects of Hydrological Drought in Lebanon,” Water Resources 
Management 23, no. 10 (2009): 1875–1876.    
36 Saleh, “Lebanon Faces Water Crisis.” 
37 Mercy Corps, “Quick Facts.” 
38 Peter Schwartzstein, “Syrian Refugees in Lebanon Camp Reliant on ‘Hell Water’ that Reduces 
Metal to Rust,” The Guardian, May 26, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2015/may/26/syrian-refugees-lebanon-shatila-camp-hell-water.  
39 Ibid.  
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already crossed the border into Jordan, and that number is expected to surpass 1,000,000 
by the end of year 2016.40 Unlike Lebanon, however, Jordan is widely known as one of 
the most water-poor countries in the Middle East with the ability to provide only 145 
cubic meters of water per person annually, substantially less than the water scarcity 
annual threshold of 500 cubic meters per person annually as established by the UN.41 
To cope with the numbers of refugees, Jordan has received substantial 
international aid to absorb the shock on resources because large camps have been 
constructed to house refugees and provide for their basic needs, including water 
availability.42 As the state has found, camps and international aid have not been enough 
to offset the impact of the refugees on Jordan’s water supply. Many towns near refugee 
camps are forced to go without water for days on end, resulting in a roughly 50 percent 
decrease in the water that is made available to those Jordanian citizens.43 
The decrease in water that is allocated to Jordanian citizens has led the media to 
criticize how the government has handled the allocation of resources to deal with the 
Syrian refugees. For instance, the Daily Star reports the refugees are squandering water 
by continuing to consume at the levels they would have if they were still in Syria, which 
possesses significantly more renewable natural water than Jordan.44 General negativity 
toward refugees is compounded because of the perception that refugees inhibit Jordanians 
ability to access education, jobs, and even private housing.45 Increased discrimination 
                                                 
40 Mercy Corps, “Quick Facts.” 
41 Caroline Gluck, “Syrian Refugee Influx Adding to Jordan’s Water Worries,” OXFAM Canada, 
accessed October 12, 2015, http://www.oxfam.ca/blogs/conflict-emergencies/refugee-influx-adding-to-
jordans-water-worries.  
42 Mercy Corps, “Quick Facts.” 
43 Gluck, “Syrian Refugee Influx.” 
44 Ahmad Khatib, “Syrian Refugees Draining Water-poor Jordan Dry,” The Daily Star, June 1, 2012, 
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2012/Jun-01/175355-syrian-refugees-draining-water-poor-
jordan-dry.ashx; Farzaneh Roudi-Fahimi, Liz Creel, and Roger-Mark De Souza, “Finding the Balance: 
Population and Water Scarcity in the Middle East and North Africa,” Population Reference Bureau, 
accessed July 23, 2016, http://www.prb.org/Publications/Reports/2002/FindingtheBalancePopulationand 
WaterScarcityintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica.aspx. 




against Syrians sets the stage for political instability because the Syrians represent an 
increasing portion of the population, if proactive measure are not taken to rectify the 
perception of Jordanians. Unfortunately for Jordan, refugees already account more than 
10 percent of the population, and that number is only expected to grow as the conflict in 
Syria continues.46  
The Global Food and Water Crisis Research Programme cites increased domestic 
competition for housing, food security, and water as a major problem faced by the 
Jordanian government.47 Only by addressing the allocation of water, the efficiency of the 
infrastructure, and the water usage of citizens will Jordan be able to avoid future 
instability. Furthermore, unlike the Lebanese, Jordanian citizens expect their government 
to cater to their needs and effectively use international aid not only for refugees but also 
for the improvement of state-run infrastructure.48 Jordan’s ability to use aid to meet these 
widely varying needs will determine how politically stable the state can remain in the 
face of a severe resource shortage. 
5. Potential Explanations and Outcomes 
The literature review outlines many factors that have contributed to the water 
crisis in Lebanon and Jordan; however, the impact of the Syrian refugees as a non-
traditional security threat leads to several expectations that connect these factors. Similar 
observations can be made about both states, but it is highly likely that they will 
experience different scenarios. 
Lebanon faces serious challenges in dealing with Syrian refugees who are 
expediting the drain on natural resources. The lack of a state response to help the 
Lebanese populace cope with over 1,000,000 refugees could have a tremendous impact 
on the legitimacy of the state, which is already low. Furthermore, if people experience the 
effect of the water shortfall and the state cannot provide an adequate or timely solution, 
                                                 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Mercy Corps, Tapped Out, “”30.  
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popular dissatisfaction could run rampant. The state’s best interest is to ensure its citizens 
are content while attempting to meet the needs of the refugees.  
The Lebanese government has limited ability to intervene, as evident by a lack of 
state-sponsored camps or institutions for the refugees; therefore, international aid is not 
as abundant as in Jordan. If Lebanon were able to take advantage of aid that accompanies 
refugee camps, it would stand to gain desperately needed resources, yet that outcome is 
unlikely due to its historical relationship with Palestinian refugees. Furthermore, Lebanon 
could extend the influence and reach of its central government because it would have to 
ensure the security of the refugees, most likely through sustained military presence in 
areas housing refugees.49 However, it is unlikely that this scenario will become reality 
because of the weakness of the state. Without international aid, Lebanon faces greater 
security challenges because it is unable to secure its borders, implement effective policy 
toward arriving refugees, and create a plan to address water availability. 
On the other hand, non-state actors in Lebanon could step in with the solutions 
necessary to provide water for citizens and refugees. Private water deliveries are common 
in the region, but with increased stress on available resources, they have become less 
frequent and more expensive.50 The balance between availability and price must be found 
and kept in check to prevent societal discord. In the event that this is achievable, the 
Lebanese government could avoid a destabilizing situation and maintain the status quo of 
having an unobtrusive role in the daily lives of its constituents.  
Jordan faces different challenges in mitigating the threat of Syrian refugees to its 
dwindling water supply. A strong response from the state has helped to curb much 
popular unrest regarding the large influx of refugees. In contrast to Lebanon, Jordan has 
received significant international aid to deal with refugees, mainly due to the construction 
of camps. The state has established and secured refugee camps and closely monitors its 
borders with Syria to track effectively the numbers of refugees entering the country. Not 
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only does this reinforce the role of the state in addressing the refugee crisis, but it also 
increases its own legitimacy due to its active role in promoting the interests of its citizens. 
Jordan has also used the plight of the refugees to call attention to its water 
problems and has done much to gain international attention for this pressing issue. 
Essentially, the state has injected itself into the refugee crisis, and it can increase its 
security and legitimacy by using the refugees and the resources tied to them in a way that 
appeal to the populace and address their concerns on water usage. Despite the significant 
amounts of aid given to Jordan and intervention by the state, commentary blaming Syrian 
refugees for problems within the country is common. 
The threat for Jordan is managing the perception of the Jordanian population 
toward the refugees. If the Jordanian people believe that the influx of refugees is 
negatively affecting the basic goods provided by the state, popular discord may follow. 
There are indications that this is starting to take place and that discrimination is becoming 
more commonplace. Also, news sources have alleged that Syrians have found it more 
difficult to cross the Jordanian border to seek refuge in camps.51 These actions may 
appease Jordanians but are unsustainable if the state wishes to continue receiving large 
amounts of international support. 
As the various causal expectations indicate, it is not that the influx of refugees 
flooding into neighboring states represents in itself a security threat, but it is the state’s 
response to the evolving situation that will determine future security. Lebanon will have 
much difficulty providing basic services to refugees and citizens; paradoxically, refugees 
do not pose much threat because expectations for state intervention are already low and 
non-state actors have set the precedent of stepping in where the state is unable to provide. 
In contrast to Lebanon, Jordan is significantly robust, but it faces increased threats from 
refugees because of its role in the region as a critical U.S. ally. The slightest hint of 
political instability could send shockwaves through the region and drastically alter U.S. 
foreign policy in the Middle East. Though the stakes are high in both cases, the 
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consequences of instability in Jordan are steep because of its close relationship with the 
U.S. and its current role as one of the only stable and reliable U.S. allies the region.  
6. Research Design 
The research design is of two comparative case studies, Lebanon and Jordan. 
These two cases are particularly significant because they represent two states that are 
very different in nature, yet are in a similar situation regarding water scarcity and Syrian 
refugees. Furthermore, the security implications the refugees impose on each state’s 
water resources differ due to the vast difference between state institutions, yet they are 
equally important for regional security.  
Also for this thesis, Evidence pertaining to water availability in Lebanon and 
Jordan is evaluated to determine the overall impact of Syrian refugees on available 
resources. Additionally, a study of policies regarding water usage, treatment, 
infrastructure, and projects is included to evaluate the effectiveness of both states to adapt 
to the changing resource requirements imposed by citizens and refugees. This provides 
the first glimpse into the possible hypotheses regarding state reactions and implications 
for each state’s citizens.  
Next, to measure the level of popular satisfaction with the state’s handling of the 
refugees and their impact on available resources, popular opinion is surveyed through 
journalistic sources. As would be expected, growing civil discontent is often 
accompanied by heavy media coverage, though some repression of media reporting 
should be expected given the regional climate toward dissenting voices. Additionally, the 
plight of the refugees is garnering significant international media attention, and that is the 
richest avenue to investigate water data. The implications revealed by journalistic 
reporting provide a valuable indication as to the effectiveness of the states’ ability to 
manage the growing concerns of citizens regarding water and refugees.  
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II. WATER SECURITY AND GOVERNANCE 
Water governance and security are two crucial elements when analyzing any 
water related issue in the Middle East. Historically, both Lebanon and Jordan have had 
very little government oversight in the water sector, and this has contributed to the crisis 
they face today. Modern political and economic pressures have led to more efforts in 
providing greater efficiency of services to water users, usually through privatization. 
Both Lebanon and Jordan have faced significant challenges to making the water sector 
profitable and capable of providing adequate services to constituents. Further 
complicating the generation of more water resources for Lebanon and Jordan are the 
regional implications of all development projects aimed at improving water security. 
Contentious relationships with Israel have precluded equitable resource sharing in the 
region and have inflamed the water shortages in both countries. Examining water 
governance and water security will establish the analytical framework against which the 
impact of the Syrian refugees can be assessed as a non-traditional security threat.  
A. LEBANON  
Lebanon has made great strides to modernize its methods of governing and 
managing water, but reform efforts suffer from many confusing laws and the many 
different organizations often duplicate projects because of a lack of coordination. The 
foundations for the current laws are recent, dating from the year 2000 with the passage of 
Law 221.52 After several amendments and corrections, the fundamental principle of the 
law is “to separate clearly between the macro and micro management of water, and to 
strengthen the policy of the decentralization by granting more autonomy to regional 
authorities involved by day to day [sic] management of the water supply.”53 A significant 
aspect of the reform effort is that changes in the management of resources are encouraged 
by the state, but private interests acting within local communities lead the efforts. This 
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approach fosters an environment conducive to investment and innovation, but it allows 
for many of the pitfalls common in Lebanon’s private sector.  
Public private partnerships (PPPs) are frequently seen as the best way to 
modernize the governance and management of water resources in Lebanon.54 The United 
Nations Council for Europe (UNECE) states, “Once rare and limited, these public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) have emerged as an important tool for improving economic 
competitiveness and infrastructure services.”55 PPPs have gained popularity throughout 
the world because they represent a collaborative effort between the state and private 
sector in an institutionalized form that is used to bring a public good to the populace.56 
This approach is attractive to Lebanon because it is designed to balance returns to 
shareholders with the delivery of a public good, in this case water.57 Despite the appeal to 
the Lebanese government for private entities to bear the burden of providing a public 
good to the people, many issues have prevented PPPs from being effective in Lebanon. 
Ghina Yamout and Dima Jamali identify several key problems regarding this strategy 
including the lack of collections for services provided and strong resistance to any rise in 
water fees.58 These factors make it exceedingly difficult for a private company or 
investor to make a profit, thus undermining the proposed role of a PPP in Lebanon.  
Even massive amounts of public spending have been inadequate to spur reform in 
water governance. Prior to the passage of Law 221, excessive public spending led to 
ineffective and redundant mechanisms for managing the delivery of water. From 1951 
through 1995, 22 autonomous authorities were established with roughly 220 commissions 
and projects tasked with managing the distribution of water to the population and for 
                                                 
54 Ghina Yamout and Dima Jamali, “A Critical Assessment of a Proposed Public Private Partnership 
(PPP) for the Management of Water Services in Lebanon,” Water Resources Management 21, no. 3 (2007): 
611, http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11269-006-9033-3.   
55 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe [UNECE], Guidebook on Promoting Good 
Governance in Public-Private Partnerships (Geneva: United Nations, 2008), 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/ceci/publications/ppp.pdf, vii. 
56 Ibid., 613. 
57 Ibid., 612. 
58 Ibid., 616.  
 17 
irrigation purposes.59 Autonomous authorities are legally tasked with operating hydraulic 
or electric projects under the guidance of the Ministry of Hydraulic and Electric 
Resources.60 Though recent reforms have done much to curb the excesses, particularly 
reducing the number of autonomous authorities to four, restructuring water governance 
with minimal government oversight has been a slow process.  
One of the reasons for the slow pace of reform in Lebanon is that a majority of the 
infrastructure modernization projects rely on funding from private donors. Reliance on 
private donors is common with PPPs; however, alternative fundraising methods such as 
the private finance initiative (PFI) use government resources to pay for infrastructure 
projects, which are then turned over to private companies to assume the risk of 
investment from the state.61 Furthermore, the Lebanese government does not have the 
finances, the coordination, or even the capability to facilitate this alternative method of 
financing infrastructure. As recently as 2014 at the 40th Water Group Coordination 
Meeting, donors were asked to place the locations of their projects on a physical map in 
an effort to curtail the duplication of projects between the autonomous authorities.62 This 
shows that development projects are contracted with little coordination between the 
autonomous authorities and that the government is not doing its part to manage the 
situation at the state level. Furthermore, it has been argued that the Lebanese 
government’s goals revolve around improving water delivery and management while 
minimizing investment by the state.63 Yet lack of investment and interest in providing 
substantial reform of the water sector has created an untenable situation for the refugees, 
private interests, and the state. 
The overarching detrimental factor to the implementation of reforms to water 
governance in Lebanon has been that water is considered a public good to the population, 
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not a commodity suitable for revenue as the government would like.64 Viewing water as a 
public good is prevalent in places with underdeveloped infrastructure and limited 
capacity to regulate the resource, while in states with developed infrastructure, people are 
accustomed to paying for clean water.65 There is no codified history of water law in 
Lebanon for comparison, but an examination of prior bylaws traces this view of water 
usage to before the 1700s.66 This fundamental view on water has precluded effective 
reform and improved governance of this vital resource. High levels of illegal well 
digging, estimated at 20,000 in the greater Beirut area alone, contribute greatly to 
undermining any meaningful reform efforts put forth by the government or the 
autonomous authorities.67 Furthermore, water usage fees do not cover the costs of 
bringing water to those residents receiving it from officially sanctioned sources.68 The 
Lebanese government needs to encourage the population to fundamentally change its 
view of receiving water as a right, but it does not have the funding or political will to 
implement those changes in a timely manner to rectify the current severe water shortages 
throughout the country.  
Water security in Lebanon has historically been viewed through a national 
security lens focusing on external threats from neighboring states, primarily Israel. Much 
of the reason for this focus on Israel stems from the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 
and subsequent occupation of roughly 40 percent of the state through 1984.69 The overt 
justification for the invasion of southern Lebanon was to stop raids made by the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization crossing into Israeli territory. During the occupation, 
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however, witnesses observed strange construction projects along the Litani River 
undertaken by the Israelis, thus creating what is known as the water divergence theory.70 
The fundamental claim made by the water divergence theory is that at some time 
during the Israeli occupation between 1982 and 1984, an 18-kilometer tunnel was made 
to link the Litani River to the Israeli side of the Lebanese border.71 Definitive proof of 
this redirection of Lebanese waters has been elusive. Even so, government officials, 
military officers, and academics from both sides of the conflict have made extensive 
efforts to prove this theory, while others have sought to discredit its claims.72 The lack of 
consensus and inability to prove any water divergence has led the Lebanese government 
to officially refute any such claims about the Litani River.73 
The contradictory nature of the water divergence theory has served the needs of 
the Lebanese government in terms of framing water security. Conflicting statements 
made by both Israeli and Lebanese government officials, some confirming the theory and 
some refuting it, cause the theory to retain some level of recognition throughout the 
populace. It never completely fades from the memories of those affected by the Israeli 
occupation, yet it never becomes the rallying cry for action against Israel. Essentially, the 
water divergence theory has enabled the Lebanese government to deflect issues regarding 
water security toward Israel as a national security issue instead of focusing on local 
policies and the inefficiency of the government.  
The influx of Syrian refugees poses a significant non-traditional security threat to 
Lebanon in several ways that directly relate to water governance and security. Now, with 
over one million refugees vying for limited water resources, the inadequacy of Lebanon’s 
water governance policies is becoming increasingly apparent to citizens and refugees 
throughout the country. Recently, the Beirut Research and Innovation Center of the 
Lebanese Center for Studies and Research recognized severe degradations to the quality 
and quantity of available water as a specific threat Lebanese citizens identify with Syrian 
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refugees.74 Moreover, Syrian refugees make water security a domestic issue that cannot 
be deflected toward a rival state. The immediacy and urgency of severe water shortages 
will not be placated by government inaction and claims by the government of possible 
Israeli meddling with water resources. This danger to Lebanese water is now associated 
with individuals residing within the borders of the state, making domestic conflict due to 
water animosity a distinct possibility. Therefore, the refugees pose a substantial threat to 
the Lebanese water governance and management policies and practices.  
B. JORDAN  
Jordan, like Lebanon, has attempted to reform the ways the state governs and 
manages water delivery to its constituents. Similar to Lebanon, Jordan has attempted to 
increase the level of privatization in the water management sector with an emphasis on 
improving delivery services for the populace. Despite this, water governance and 
management is still largely controlled by the state and private companies have made 
limited inroads. Jordan still relies upon a highly centralized structure for determining 
water policy, and this is reinforced by the lack of privatization and accountability 
mechanisms in the water sector. The influx of nearly one million Syrian refugees presents 
a significant threat to this framework because the central government is the sole 
institution capable of implementing new measures to curtail the strain on the limited 
water resources throughout the state.  
Modern water governance and management in Jordan began in 1992 with the 
establishment of the Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI). This institution was 
designed oversee planning and management of the water supply and coordinate national 
policy and water strategy throughout the state. Another institution, the Water Authority of 
Jordan (WAJ), under the authority of the MWI, is responsible for the management of 
sewer and water systems. A key aspect of the WAJ is that it is not dependent on the MWI 
financially or administratively. The relationship between the MWI and WAJ set the stage 
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for privatization efforts throughout the water sector and Jordan. Additionally, it created 
an environment that allowed Jordan to separate national water infrastructure policies 
from water delivery policies.75 
Another key area of reform within the Jordanian water sector was establishing and 
enforcing tariffs on water usage by private citizens and commercial businesses beginning 
in 1997.76 Before this time, the costs of delivering water and sewage services to the 
population were greater than the revenues generated by tariffs because of inefficiencies 
and the inability of the government to collect fees for services provided.77 Concerning the 
new tariff system, Jan-Erik Gustafsson, Rebhieh Suleiman, and Lisa Van Well offer the 
following explanation: 
The new mechanism differentiates between residential and non-domestic 
commercial users. It changed from a progressive block tariff structure of 
six water-consumption blocks, at a fixed charge for both residential and 
commercial consumers, to a four-part tariff for domestic users and a 
proportionally higher rate for commercial users.78  
The tariff’s bias toward domestic users has forced larger commercial users to purchase 
water from private vendors who are able to deliver water at lower prices largely through 
the usage of illegal and unregulated wells.79 
Despite the drastic institutional and fiscal reforms to the water sector with the 
creation of the MWI and the WAJ, Jordan’s ability to change the nature of water 
governance has not advanced far beyond the creation of these two institutions and the 
establishment of the largely ineffectual tariff system. The Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) suggests Jordan’s water sector would benefit from 
consolidating responsibilities from many uncoordinated agencies and closing holes in 
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regulations pertaining to tariffs and the performance of water utility services.80 The main 
source of concern that has precluded larger scale privatization and reform is the economic 
environment.81 Currently, the fiscal climate in the Jordanian water sector is not 
conducive to private investment and innovation. The tariff structure does not recover the 
operational costs of delivering water to customers, and the state does not have the 
financial resources to make up the shortfall to promote private business growth.82 Jordan 
has an unsustainable water sector in desperate need of policy reform, but fiscal 
constraints make maintaining the status quo the easy course of action. 
As expected in Jordan’s governance structure, there is almost no government 
accountability in the water sector, and there is a severe lack of stakeholder engagement in 
policy formulation. Both detract from the state’s ability to effectively govern and manage 
water resources.83 Without addressing these aspects, the water sector will most likely 
continue to practice inadequate governance because there are few, if any, means for 
constituents to provide feedback to improve water management mechanisms. Even with 
the most basic aspects of governance, such as contract standardization, performance 
reviews, and feasibility studies, both the MWI and WAJ fall short of providing 
transparent policies and reasoning behind their practices.84  
Another significant issue compounded by the lack of stakeholder engagement is 
the tariff structure, which holds unintended consequences for the people of Jordan. Water 
sector stakeholders including customers, donors, private enterprises, and government 
officials tasked managing water resources.85 At the outset of water sector reforms, the 
tariff structure was intended simply to cover the costs of operation and maintenance, with 
the additional benefit of assisting low-income residents through the progressive nature of 
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the increasing block tariff system.86 This tariff system is designed for those who use less 
water to pay a small fee, and as water usage increases, so does the fee for delivery 
through the state owned infrastructure.87 The assumption by the central government is 
that lower income households use less water; however, some reports estimate that higher 
income households make up the majority of the water users in the lowest tariff block 
under the current structure.88 This reverse outcome is due to higher income families 
being better able to maintain the infrastructure in their homes, including fixing leaking 
pipes and faucets. Additionally, inhabitants of these residences are generally better 
educated and are more aware of the water scarcity in Jordan, which makes them able and 
willing to actively take measures to conserve water. As a result, lower income households 
that are supposed to be the primary benefactors of the increasing block tariff generally 
cannot easily take advantage of the tariff structure. For obvious reasons, such as the lack 
of financial resources to fix leaking pipes and fewer educational opportunities, which 
leaves these same households uninformed on water conservation, these families are 
unwittingly forced into a higher block of the water tariff. Moreover, lower income 
households are most often not part of the central sewage network and that means they pay 
significantly higher rates for water treatment and sanitation services.89 Few avenues for 
stakeholder involvement and no government accountability are two preconditions that 
have created the situation whereby the most vulnerable constituents of the Jordanian 
water sector are adversely impacted by the very policies meant to provide them with 
assistance.  
No analysis of water governance and management in Jordan would be complete 
without examining the agricultural sector and its influence on policy pertaining to water. 
The agricultural sector’s importance in the development of water policy stems from the 
network of patron-client relationships created by King Hussein during the 1950s and 
1960s. These relationships became a strong source of support for the central government 
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at a time when many urban political movements were openly questioning the authority of 
King Hussein. Thus, the rural elites, predominantly holding agricultural interests, became 
entrenched in the Jordanian political process. In an effort to foster the relationship, much 
leeway was granted to them to develop water policies that specifically benefit agriculture 
and rural landowners.90 
One of the consequences of this patron-client network is that the agriculture sector 
enjoys unregulated pumping of water at virtually no cost. The main factor behind this is 
the power of the agriculture lobby in Jordanian politics. Several laws have been passed to 
curtail the unabated pumping of water by farmers, but in each case, the lobby has been 
able to significantly alter the legislation or blatantly disregard the law. Moreover, the 
government is willing to do little more than rubber stamp legislation promoting water 
conservation for agricultural use despite the fact that the agriculture sector is responsible 
for the vast majority of water consumption in Jordan. Agricultural interests have 
precluded any significant reforms to the water sector. This influence has also inhibited 
other stakeholder influence on water policy and has decreased the urgency for 
government transparency and accountability toward any other interests.91 It remains 
unclear when water policies will become an issue of demand by Jordanians against the 
interests of entrenched political elites.  
Jordan faces potential domestic political conflict due to the strain Syrian refugees 
place on its scarce water resources. The impact of the refugees is most apparent in poor 
rural communities that have had water deliveries significantly curtailed as a result of the 
influx in refugees.92 For example, in the villages outside the Zaatari refugee camp, 
Jordanians watch tankers, which once brought them water, pass through without stopping 
on their way to the refugee camp. The strain on resources has fostered a growing hostility 
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between Jordanians and the refugees.93 Political elites will likely attempt to take 
advantage of this situation, blaming the refugees to divert attention from their own role in 
creating the problem of water scarcity. Jordanian patronage politics have essentially 
created the water shortage seen today, but the same political structure may demonize the 
very group of people who have shown how truly ineffectual the state has been at 
managing and governing water resources—the refugees. 
Water security in Jordan is tied to domestic pressures on policymaking, but also 
closely related to national security factors that impact neighboring states. Dwindling 
resources and fierce competition over the remaining resources are a common theme 
throughout the Middle East, but Jordan in particular faces unique circumstances when 
faced with water security. Jordan already has one of the lowest per capita water 
consumption rates in the world at 145 cubic meters annually, but high fertility rates and 
the surge of Syrian refugees threaten to shatter the fragile international water sharing 
agreements with neighboring states and drive water availability and consumption to even 
lower levels.94  
Jordan is in a precarious situation with regard to securing its own water resources. 
The main waterways that Jordan relies upon are the Jordan river and the Yarmouk river, 
which also constitute borders between Israel and Syria, respectively. A key challenge to 
Jordan’s usage of these rivers is that their headwaters originate in Lebanon, Syria, and 
Israel, which has led those countries to claim specific water usage rights of these 
sources.95 Therefore, Jordan is most often excluded from undertaking unilateral 
development projects along these rivers that could potentially provide it with increased 
storage and delivery capacity. Given this riparian framework, Jordan has sought 
cooperation with other states, traditionally Syria, to gain access to increasing shares of 
available water. Unfortunately, cooperation with Syria has soured relations with Israel, 
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which have been contributing factors in conflicts, most notably in 1953 and 1967, 
resulting in major changes of control of the water resources in Israel’s favor.96 
The Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty of 1994 drastically changed the relationship 
between the two states by settling all land and water disputes and regulating water 
resources that are shared along their borders.97 While the treaty did settle disputes over 
water between the two states, it has had a marginal impact on regulating any type of 
equitable water extraction between Israel and Jordan, with the vast majority of resources 
being controlled and extracted by Israel. A realistic view of this agreement is that it was 
signed for largely political reasons, with very few details actually agreed upon by either 
Jordan or Israel. Despite the landmark nature of the agreement and its supposed benefits, 
it has not significantly increased Jordan’s water security.  
Three issues within the treaty were intentionally vague and unresolved, as to 
enable the signing of the treaty by both parties.98 Fischhendler argues that the first point 
to be negotiated was the division of resources of the Yarmouk and Jordan Rivers as well 
as the aquifer in the Arava/Araba desert. However, the treaty does not clearly delineate 
any substantial change in resource management from either party. Second, Israel and 
Jordan attempted to set the criteria needed for dividing water equitably between the two 
states, but came to no substantial agreement. Finally, the issue of unilateral development 
projects impacting shared resources was discussed during negotiations but not clarified. 
In each case, an issue deemed to be critical to the treaty was discussed during 
negotiations; yet none of these was effectively resolved by the treaty of 1994, 
demonstrating each country’s preference for superficial political victories as opposed to a 
substantive constructive agreement between states.99  
Several factors significantly impacted the decision to formulate an agreement on 
paper, which both states knew would not substantially change the distribution of 
resources throughout the region. Cost and location of additional infrastructure needed to 
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carry out the terms of the treaty were never agreed upon, nor did they agree upon a 
schedule for implementing changes in the allocation of water. Additionally, the division 
of resources was based off of historical withdrawals, but those statistics were either non-
existent or disputed by both states. Finally, upstream development projects conducted by 
Jordan and Syria were only allowed should they not harm Israeli interests downriver, but 
Israeli interests were never defined. It is clear that under these terms, no substantial 
change to resource sharing would be reached between Jordan and Israel through the 1994 
treaty.100  
In the context of ineffective water governance and symbolic but hollow 
agreements to secure additional resources, large numbers of Syrian refugees could 
become a significant force with potentially destabilizing ramifications. The impact the 
refugees have on Jordan’s limited water supply cannot be overstated for domestic water 
policy. With nearly one million more people using water, the practices of the agricultural 
industry have become unsustainable and continuing to support those policies may result 
in large-scale civil unrest as water supplies dwindle further. The Jordanian government 
will soon be in a position where it has to choose between providing water to the 
population and refugees or to the agricultural political support base it so desperately 
needs. Moreover, the backlash from the government’s inability to generate any 
meaningful advancement in water security vis-à-vis Israel could prove significant as well. 
The influx of Syrian refugees may act as the impetus for the Jordanian people to demand 
changes in water policy that will ripple throughout the Middle East. 
C. SUMMARY  
Policies on water governance and regional actions to secure more water resources 
have had a significant impact on Lebanon and Jordan. Both states have sought to 
privatize their water sectors to make them profitable, albeit for different reasons. Lebanon 
seeks improvements with minimal government spending involved, and Jordan has kept 
control in the hands of the government with no aspirations of decentralizing policy-
making pertaining to water. Water security is a challenge for Lebanon and Jordan, one 
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that is closely related the role Israel plays in managing regional water resources. The 
Lebanese occupation from 1982–1984 led Israel to act with impunity while allegedly 
siphoning resource from the Litani River. The Israel-Jordan treaty of 1994 was touted to 
have settled all land and water disputes between the two states, but in reality, it proved to 
be a hollow document unable to allocate resources equally. Under this framework, the 
possibility for the Syrian refugees to destabilize society grows exponentially. As has been 
seen in Lebanon and Jordan, the inadequacies of water governance and security will 
continue to create pressure for change as international scrutiny increases on nations 
hosting refugees. 
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III. LEBANON’S WATER AND THE REFUGEES 
The influx of Syrian refugees into Lebanon and their effect on available water 
resources presents a significant non-traditional security threat. Aside from simply more 
people needing water in an environment with scarce availability, a host of other factors 
comes into play when determining the impact of refugees on this state. Not only is the 
available water depleted faster, but the inadequate infrastructure is also strained past its 
limits, an act which has significant consequences for the refugees and Lebanese society 
as a whole. Furthermore, the effects of the refugees on water supplies are felt 
disproportionately throughout the state but impact those closer to large populations of 
refugees more than others. The Lebanese government’s ability to respond to these issues 
as well as its ability to leverage international organizations and resources to mitigate 
these factors will eventually determine the severity of the potential sociopolitical threat 
posed by the Syrian refugees. 
The water sector in Lebanon has fallen behind in terms of development, largely 
since the end of the Civil War.101 The lack of development is not only apparent with 
regulations and governance but also with the physical infrastructure that is used to 
provide water to roughly 4.5 million Lebanese citizens. Moreover, the lack of 
development is more acute in some areas than others. For instance, in the Akkar 
Governorate in northern Lebanon that hosts approximately 110,000 refugees, and in the 
governorate, even lower levels of infrastructure development than found in the rest of the 
country are common.102 A recent United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) study discovered that prior to the arrival of Syrian refugees, 79 percent of the 
state had access to drinking water, but only 54 percent of those in the Akkar region had 
the same access to water.103 The refugees have caused a sharp decline in the amount of 
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water available for those in the Akkar region simply due to the sheer numbers that have 
settled in the governorate. 
Further complicating the lack of water infrastructure in the region are the types of 
settlements where the refugees are residing. It is estimated that 45 percent of the refugees 
in the Akkar Governorate live in either substandard buildings or informal settlements. 
The UNHCR defines substandard buildings as “Garages and shops, warehouses, one 
room structures, unfinished buildings, and other privately owned, unfinished, or 
otherwise substandard shelter units not originally intended to serve as dwellings are 
generally treated and assessed similarly by humanitarian partners in Akkar.”104 Informal 
settlements are loosely defined by UNHCR as tents or other handmade structures.105 
What both of these UNHCR definitions suggest is that roughly 45 percent of the refugee 
population in the Akkar Governorate is living in structures or areas that were never 
intended to have permanent water infrastructure or services provided by state 
infrastructure. 
The result of large numbers of refugees taking up residence in substandard or 
temporary shelters is evident when the source of what little water they do have access to 
is examined. Once again, in the Akkar Governorate 79 percent of refugees in informal 
settlements and 41 percent of refugees in substandard structures receive water from wells, 
which means 46 percent of all refugees in the region use wells for water.106 There is little 
reason to assume that the wells used by refugees in the Akkar region are sanctioned or 
regulated by the Lebanese government in any way. A commonplace arrangement is for 
those that own the property on which an informal settlement or substandard structure are 
erected to dig the well and include water charges as part of the rent paid by the 
refugees.107 Though this informal system is able to provide water to refugees in need, the 
water is often of very low quality and refugees often have no way to filter out 
contaminants. Moreover, this arrangement removes the central government from delivery 
                                                 
104 UNHCR, WASH Assessment, 11. 
105 Ibid. 
106 Ibid., 13. 
107 Ibid. 
 31 
of the service and removes any revenue that the state would be able to use to actually 
improve the infrastructure for the refugees and local population sharing the burden of 
scant water availability. 
The growing trend of digging wells for water outside the purview of the state is 
significant not only in the northern reaches of Lebanon, but also in the capital city of 
Beirut. The World Bank estimates there are 20,000 illegal wells in and around Beirut, 
mostly used for private water trucks to deliver water in and around the city.108 Though 
this trend most likely started well before the arrival of over one million Syrian refugees in 
Lebanon, the dramatic influx of Syrians undoubtedly accelerated the rate at which the 
illegal wells were dug. This suggests that not only are the Syrian refugees willing to rely 
on informal networks and arrangements to meet their needs, but also Lebanese citizens 
are relying less on the state to provide public goods. Moreover, the digging of illegal 
wells used by both refugees and citizens illustrates the shortcomings of the state-run 
infrastructure and its inability to cope with the Syrian refugees. 
Not only does the inadequate infrastructure lead individuals to secure water 
through means outside of state control, but also the unregulated increase in water 
extraction through illegal wells has significant negative impacts on the quality of water 
for the Syrian refugees and Lebanese citizens as well. The increased levels of extraction 
have caused the water table to drop to alarmingly low levels, causing seawater intrusion 
into the central water supply.109 The most dramatic example of the declining water 
quality is in Shatila refugee camp in a southern suburb of Beirut.110 Tap water in this 
camp is a salty and repugnant smelling liquid that is said to rust silverware after only 
roughly 30 minutes upon exposure.111 These reports from the Shatila refugee camp are 
not exaggerations, but they are certainly the most extreme examples of the poor water 
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quality. Even in many Lebanese communities in Beirut, water quality has degraded to the 
point that at times tap water has too much salinity for consumption.112  
The Lebanese water infrastructure was not able to meet demand before arrival of 
the Syrians, let alone afterward. The true problem the refugees have exacerbated is the 
illegal digging of wells for unregulated extraction, though this practice has been already 
in use throughout the state. These illegal wells do provide water to the refugees and 
Lebanese citizens who are the most vulnerable to water shortages, but they have several 
negative consequences for the national water outlook. Essentially, the informal networks 
used by refugees and citizens to get water are impacting the ability of the government to 
improve the infrastructure because of the significant amounts of lost revenue for the state. 
The refugee crisis has merely underscored the degree to which the state of Lebanon’s 
infrastructure cannot cope with the increased strain imposed by over one million Syrians. 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have made great efforts to bridge the 
gap between infrastructure shortfalls and provision of water to Syrian refugees in 
Lebanon. A total of $11.1 million has been allocated through the UNHCR to address 
sanitation and water supplies in municipalities particularly vulnerable to water 
shortages.113 This funding has enabled many NGOs to establish programs that not only 
benefit the refugees, but also the local Lebanese population, which often finds itself 
without water as the Syrians do. Beyond simply delivering water and improving 
infrastructure, many NGOs have established programs that focus on water, sanitation, and 
hygiene (WASH).114 Despite the programs and projects established to help the refugees 
and Lebanese, there are many significant hurdles facing NGOs in truly changing the 
water outlook for people in Lebanon. Organizations attempting to provide access to clean 
water face an uphill struggle against environmental and structural factors that are 
frequently unintended consequences.  
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The most frequent ways aid is provided by NGOs to ease the lack of water faced 
by refugees is through giving tanks, filters, and pumps to refugees so they are able to 
have a centrally located water source and the ability to decontaminate potentially unclean 
water.115 This form of aid, however, still relies upon dwindling amounts of ground water 
that has already become more contaminated with the increased extraction. Furthermore, 
many of the tanks provided by NGOs are filled using the existing water infrastructure, 
where available, which is notoriously unreliable. If unable to connect to the 
infrastructure, water from illegal wells at informal settlements is collected and stored, 
which is equally poor, if not worse, in quality than water from the state infrastructure. 
This is particularly problematic because UNHCR has determined there is a significant 
amount of contamination in most of the water sources accessed by refugees due to 
excessive extraction, chemical runoff from farming, and lack of adequate wastewater 
treatment.116  
In the most desperate cases, water is trucked to the informal refugee settlements, 
completely bypassing the potential contamination brought by wells or piped water from 
the central infrastructure.117 This method has provided temporary relief to some refugees, 
but it is unsustainable for over one million refugees. Moreover, because of the difficulty 
in arranging water deliveries, frequently settlements only receive a water delivery 
biweekly while others are completely overlooked.118  A further complication is that when 
deliveries are made, there is a rush by refugees to collect as much water as possible, 
which rapidly depletes the delivery. This then means it is often several days or a week 
from the time when the communal tank is emptied until the next delivery.119 Since the 
refugees generally do not have any means of uncontaminated storage for the water they 
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extract from the communal tank, a significant health risk is still present even when clean 
water is brought to the informal settlements.  
NGOs have limited ability to guarantee the safety of water they deliver all the 
way to the end user. To address this issue, many organizations have undertaken projects 
to improve the physical infrastructure provided by the state.120 The unfortunate 
consequence is that the efforts must also be coordinated through the appropriate Lebanese 
government offices, which are consistently understaffed and underfunded.121 Though the 
NGOs may be ready to commence a project that would drastically increase the quality of 
life for numerous refugees and Lebanese citizens, government bureaucracy and rampant 
corruption often stands in the way, usually causing significant delays or derailing the 
projects entirely.  
Another factor inhibiting the effectiveness of many NGOs to provide adequate 
water to refugees is the increasing restrictions placed on visas for foreign workers to enter 
Lebanon. Several NGOs have scaled down their operations due to the current visa 
restrictions.122 There are also proposed restrictions that would further limit foreign 
employees to 10 percent and would also apply to NGOs providing emergency relief to 
refugees.123 The supposed justification by the central government is to facilitate the 
hiring of Lebanese workers and professionals given the high unemployment rate.124 
Unfortunately for NGOs specializing in water, this particular field of expertise has been 
neglected by Lebanon for years, and there is little, if any, indigenous expertise to be 
gained from hiring locally. Thus, many NGOs are finding their efforts futile because they 
are unable to get the experts necessary to address the water crisis in the country. 
Furthermore, some smaller NGOs have been forced to leave Lebanon because they are 
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unable to operate under the new employment restrictions, which further diminishes 
services to the refugees.125 
The restrictions placed on many NGOs by the Lebanese government, including 
those proposing water infrastructure projects, is somewhat paradoxical when viewed as a 
part of the greater refugee situation and its impact on water in the state. The government 
understands the water shortage and the impact of the Syrian refugees on remaining 
resources. Recently, an official at the Ministry of Energy and Water stated, “Because of 
the Syrians, a water balance that should have been negative in 2030 is negative now.”126 
Furthermore, the Lebanese government recognizes that, in addition to an already 
beleaguered population of over four million citizens, it is understaffed to manage water 
demand for an additional one to two million refugees.127 There is a clear separation 
between the resources and expertise in the government and what is truly needed to 
improve water availability and safety to informal refugee settlements as well as the 
affected Lebanese communities. 
Even with this knowledge, the government still supports a policy that forbids 
dedicated refugee camps.128 In conjunction with the restrictions placed on NGO work 
visas (to encourage domestic hiring), attempts to improve the water infrastructure for 
both the refugees and Lebanese population are severely impeded. With refugees spread 
out across the state, infrastructure improvements provide only a local benefit at best. 
Additionally, the dispersion of the refugee populations requires an even greater level of 
coordination across NGOs. In the early stages of the crisis, many efforts were duplicated 
with multiple water tanks being delivered to the same refugee settlement while other 
settlements were overlooked.129 There is also a drastic difference in the aid certain 
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settlements receive compared to others. Without question, NGOs are providing the best 
water delivery services within their capabilities, but the varying degrees of support of the 
receiving communities throughout the state creates an avenue for social unrest focused 
against the government and NGOs alike. 
The social and political repercussions of the Syrian refugees with regard to the 
Lebanese water supply are difficult to discern apart from the effects of the refugee crisis 
as a whole. Water availability has been a problem in Lebanon even prior to the arrival of 
over one million refugees; however, the influx of refugees has brought much 
international attention to the scarcity of water in the state. Though specific conclusions 
cannot be drawn at this time to link water availability directly to social or political unrest, 
the lack of water for refugees and the impact on the Lebanese population has the potential 
to negatively impact society by exacerbating preexisting issues. Furthermore, the 
attention and assistance the refugees receive could inflame social tensions and 
xenophobia as well as highlight the ineffectual policies of the Lebanese government, 
which were designed to mitigate the crisis, yet have harmed many refugees and citizens 
of Lebanon. 
With the Syrian civil war entering its fifth year, Lebanese hospitality is waning 
and there is increasing social discord, often at the expense of the refugees.130 One of the 
major grievances of the Lebanese population revolves around employment and the 
negative effects of the Syrians on local labor markets. Unemployment rates for Lebanese 
have roughly doubled since the influx of the refugees, reaching 24 percent, but rates soar 
higher among younger demographics.131 Further compounding the issue, wages are 
significantly lower for refugees working illegally compared to their legal citizen 
counterparts. Estimates show that Syrians are working for wages that are 40 percent 
below the state mandated minimum wage, which has driven the perception that the 
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refugees are putting Lebanese citizens out of jobs and created a sense of resentment 
amongst communities.132 
Another factor greatly complicating the nature of the refugee crisis for Lebanon is 
the demographic shift of hosting a majority Syrian Sunni population, which totals 1.3 
million registered refugees in the state.133 This influx has the potential to drastically 
change the delicate sectarian political balance between the various religious groups 
represented in Lebanon. The majority of Syrian refugees are located in the Sunni 
dominated northern governorates of Lebanon and the major coastal cities of Beirut and 
Tripoli. Growth of refugee settlements in the south have caused increased strains because 
southern Lebanon is a majority Shi’a area and the powerbase for the predominately Shi’a 
Hezbollah in Lebanon.  
Additionally, most large scale NGO support is focused on delivering services to 
refugee populations in the northern reaches of Lebanon. Since the circumstances are so 
dire for those large informal settlements, most NGOs have reached their capacity to 
deliver aid, leaving few options for assistance to refugees located elsewhere. Given this, 
the burden for hosting refugees in southern Lebanon is placed primarily on the existing 
communities with little chance of receiving substantive help from the international 
community for the foreseeable future.134   
Though no sectarian conflict has broken out in southern Lebanon, tensions have 
risen between the Sunni Lebanese and Sunni refugees in the north over inequality in aid 
provided by NGOs. In an attempt to keep order, host communities have placed curfews 
and other restrictions on the refugees.135 Also, violence has increased, particularly toward 
women, in those areas with large refugee populations.136 This is a potential factor that 
has led to a perceived injustice faced by the local Lebanese. The vast majority of NGO 
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aid, whether food, water, or services is directed toward refugees. Where the resources of 
NGOs fall short, the local community fills in to provide for the refugees, often 
involuntarily with the digging of illegal wells or informal settlements being constructed 
on their land. This dynamic between NGOs and refugees in host communities has led 
many local populations to feel neglected by aid organizations since many Lebanese are 
just as destitute as the refugees they are hosting, yet are not eligible to receive aid 
directed for the Syrians.  
The political climate in Lebanon also contributes to the potential for social 
upheaval due to refugee and water issues. The Lebanese reaction to the Palestinian 
refugees in 1948 created the undertones paralleling the political realities facing the 
Syrians today. The Palestinians upset the domestic balance of power within Lebanon, 
which was based upon maintaining the balance between Sunnis, Shiites, and Christians. 
The Palestinians were discriminated against through state policies that prevented them 
from land ownership and legal employment. The goal of these policies was to create an 
environment where seeking refuge in another state would be preferable to staying long-
term in Lebanon. Unfortunately, these same policies are directed at the Syrian refugees 
nearly 70 years later. The overarching goal of the Lebanese government is to ensure that 
the migration of Syrians in Lebanon is a temporary situation, even though the policies 
used to facilitate that goal have failed in the past, particularly with the Palestinians.137 
An additional factor that is potentially a consequence of the restrictive policies 
employed by the Lebanese government is the increase in radicalization, particularly 
among the Sunni community within Lebanon. As recently as 2014, Lebanese government 
officials made statements referring to the refugees as a threat to security and even 
postulated that a significant number of the refugees had received prior military 
training.138 Regardless of whether such statements are factually correct, they demonstrate 
the underlying suspicion that the central government harbors toward the refugees and 
informs its policies. Thus, many communities have shown their mistrust for the refugees 
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by implementing their own discriminatory policies. Violence, discrimination, and 
curfews are commonplace tactics used throughout host communities to control or 
eventually evict refugees living in informal settlements, and those refugees have no 
recourse to improve their situation because the government of Lebanon condones the 
actions taken against the refugees.139 
The consequences of government and community actions toward the Syrian 
refugees are significant when analyzing the social friction within Lebanon. Without the 
ability to use the local authorities to stop the discriminatory actions against them, the 
Syrian refugees are pushed toward using informal networks to meet their needs. Raphaël 
Lefèvre of the Carnegie Middle East Center offers this summary of the situation:  
The multiplication of informal settlements, the deterioration of the 
socioeconomic situation, and the absence of a short-term prospect for the 
creation of safe refugee camps may push a number of Syrians toward 
militant groups, which often provide financial incentives, care for families, 
and offer a temporary sense of security.140  
Essentially, the refugees will find security wherever it may be present, either through 
NGO support or through avenues outside the purview of the state or international 
organizations. The non-state or NGO organizations have a significant potential to get 
swept into the rising trend of sectarian violence occurring in Lebanon, thus drawing 
Syrian refugees into those preexisting conflicts. 
The scarcity of water and the impact that Syrian refugees have on the supply are 
not the direct cause of the social and political tensions seen today throughout Lebanon. 
Many of the issues regarding water throughout the state have been present since long 
before the arrival of the refugees. Though not directly related, the lack of water for the 
refugees and citizens alike could become a mobilizing factor deepening the divisions 
within Lebanon. As basic needs cannot be met by the state, informal networks and 
organizations will increasingly fill the void left by the state in efforts to meet the needs of 
their constituents. The danger is that violence is increasing throughout the state for 
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various reasons and the scarcity of water is becoming another reason for violent activity. 
Furthermore, the mainly sectarian militancy seen in Lebanon has the potential to turn on 
the Syrians because they are primarily Sunni refugees. The demand for water as a basic 
need could inflame the social, religious, and political tensions with which Lebanon is 
struggling to cope.  
The refugee crisis has highlighted the desperately inadequate state owned water 
infrastructure to provide valuable resources, not only to the Syrians, but also to the 
Lebanese. Compounding the issue of poor infrastructure, the government has also 
implemented ineffective policies for managing the flow of refugees and providing water 
to all within the borders. To combat the shortage of water and desperate conditions the 
refugees face, NGO organizations have greatly stepped up support to provide aid to the 
Syrians, but labor policies and sanitation concerns have greatly hampered these efforts. 
These conditions have pushed many refugees to rely on informal networks and 
organizations to meet their basic needs; however, the growing trend of militancy and 
violence throughout Lebanon has the potential to draw Syrians into conflict through 
groups operating within Lebanon. Perhaps it is only a matter of time before the lack of 
basic needs, such as water, serves to mobilize the people within Lebanon against the 
government or themselves; this makes the water crisis a non-traditional security threat.  
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IV. JORDAN’S WATER AND THE REFUGEES 
Water scarcity in Jordan is a politically charged issue receiving significant 
amounts of scrutiny at the local and national levels. Inadequate infrastructure and 
governance have plagued the state, making the water crisis even more severe. The 
massive flow of Syrian refugees into Jordan has compounded many of the issues that the 
beleaguered water sector has attempted to rectify, and the results have been disastrous for 
both the state and the refugees. Interestingly though, neither of these issues are new to 
Jordanians, who have been under water restrictions since the 1980s and have hosted 
several different refugee populations for significant amounts of time. Despite Jordan’s 
familiarity with both water scarcity and refugees, these two issues have collided in ways 
that have the potential to destabilize the state in ways not seen before, making the issues 
significant non-traditional security threats. As the capacity of the Jordanian water 
infrastructure is strained in increasingly intense and unanticipated ways, NGOs are 
attempting to fill the gap of services. In addition, new social and political divisions are 
more prevalent both within and between refugees and host communities. As the conflict 
in Syria drags on, the problems facing Jordan and its refugee population will continue to 
grow and intensify.   
The Syrian refugees have a significant impact on the water infrastructure in 
Jordan by highlighting the government’s inability to provide necessary services 
throughout the state. The Sumaya pump station is a prime example how several factors 
negatively impacting water availability have compounded to make the situation worse. 
Located in the north of Jordan, the pump station has traditionally been responsible for 
providing water to roughly 80,000 Jordanians. Even with this population prior to the 
refugee crisis, the station provided intermittent water flow at best. The influx of Syrian 
refugees has forced this pumping station to provide services to over 200,000 people, 
which represents a 250 percent increase in demand. Further hampering the pumping 
station’s ability to meet demand is the significant amount of water leaking out of the 
rundown pipes. Up to 75 percent of water from the Sumaya pump station is estimated to 
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be lost from leakage.141 The scenario at this station is commonly repeated across towns 
and villages located in the northern parts of Jordan. Moreover, throughout the entirety of 
Jordan, it is currently estimated that 76 billion liters of water are lost annually through 
poor infrastructure, equating to enough water for 26 million people to sustain themselves 
at a consumption rate of 80 liters per day.142 
Another way in which the Syrians impact Jordanian infrastructure is through the 
construction of refugee camps. The largest of the camps, known as Zaatari, has had 
significant effects on the surrounding infrastructure. Built somewhat hastily to house the 
fleeing Syrians, this camp now holds approximately 80,000 refugees.143 Located in the 
desert close to the Syrian border, the camp does not have direct access to Jordanian 
infrastructure. To provide water to the camp, extraction from the village wells across the 
nearby town of Mafraq cover the needs of 80 percent of refugees within the camp.144 
This solution is unsustainable and has negatively impacted the infrastructure and 
resources available to the two villages within close proximity to the camp. Prior to the 
construction of the camp, the aquifer from which the villages in Mafraq draw was 
decreasing rapidly from over extraction.145 Unfortunately, the consequence of the 
decreasing water levels is that the Jordanians in Mafraq, and across the northern parts of 
Jordan, are relegated to receiving water only one or two times per week.146  
The inability to effectively deliver water to both refugees and Jordanians 
represents only half of the infrastructure problems exacerbated by the crisis in Syria. 
Wastewater and sewage infrastructures are completely overwhelmed due to the increase 
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in population since the majority of refugees residing in Jordan do not live in camps but 
among the local population.147 Thirty-five percent of the people in areas hosting refugees 
do not have access to municipal sewage services. Those who do have access have seen 
drastic increases in infrastructure failures, usually resulting in overflows of raw sewage. 
Complaints lodged with local infrastructure administrators have doubled or tripled in 
many communities as a result of broken or clogged sewage systems. These infrastructure 
breakdowns have the potential to lead to groundwater contamination, which could have 
catastrophic effects on the already dwindling water supply.148 
Perhaps even more damaging to the remaining water supplies are the issues of 
wastewater and sewage treatment emanating from Zataari refugee camp. Much like there 
is a lack of infrastructure to bring water into the camp, there is no large-scale 
infrastructure in place to bring sewage and waste out of the camp. Residents of the camp 
rely upon a network of ditches, lagoons, and cesspools that are periodically emptied to 
septic tanks away from Zataari.149 This opens up the possibility for serious groundwater 
contamination because Zataari refugee camp sits atop the Shallow Aquifer System and 
the Upper Cretaceous Aquifer System at greater depths.150 Essentially, the waste of over 
80,000 refugees is seeping into the ground directly above two of the only sources of clean 
groundwater in the northern part of Jordan because of a lack of proper infrastructure.  
A recent study was conducted and published in the Journal of Environmental 
Protection to determine the environmental effects of the camp on the groundwater in and 
around the Zataari refugee camp. The results revealed that while the camp is responsible 
for a significant increase in surface pollution, the groundwater was not yet contaminated 
by the raw sewage from the cesspools.151 The ramifications of the study are somewhat 
paradoxical for the refugees and Jordanians in close proximity to the camp because in the 
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short term it means their groundwater remains safe. Because of this, there is no 
motivation for the government to improve infrastructure in the area since the environment 
can cope with the waste issue for now. The danger is that the longer the conflict in Syria 
lasts and the refugees stay, the chances of Zataari polluting the groundwater sources in 
northern Jordan increase, which would create a water scarcity issue of an entirely 
different magnitude than the one that is happening now.  
The refugee crisis also has an indirect impact on various infrastructure projects in 
Jordan. Prior to the arrival of Syrian refugees in Jordan, the freshwater supplies to the 
kingdom were expected to run out around the year 2060.152 The refugee crisis also 
coincides with massive growth in the Jordanian population. From 1980 through 2008, the 
population of the state grew by an astonishing 86 percent, which is causing serious strain 
on the water infrastructure.153 With the rapid surge in population due to the influx of 
refugees, the expectation is that Jordanian water will not last far beyond 2030.154  
To alleviate the stress on the water infrastructure, the government focuses on 
mega projects that are extremely costly and will take years to complete. The goal of the 
Disi Aquifer project is to meet the water needs of Jordan through 2022; however, the 
revised estimate anticipates the project will only meet water needs through 2016. What is 
particularly alarming is that the project was completed in 2013 at a cost of $1.1 billion. 
Many in Jordan place the blame on the Syrian refugees for skewing demand for water 
and thus decreasing the effectiveness of the massive Disi Aquifer project.155 
Due to the increasingly desperate situation facing both refugees and Jordanians in 
need of water, NGOs have a critical impact in mitigating some of the water scarcity 
issues faced by the refugees. NGOs are often able to fill the void left by inadequate 
government services and infrastructure. Furthermore, they have access to resources and 
expertise specifically designed to address pressing issues that cannot be resolved through 
the use of indigenous enterprise. Despite the widely recognized vital role of NGOs in 
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providing services, they face structural constraints that have created more social and 
political divisions as well as impeding their effectiveness. The main obstacle for NGOs 
providing aid in Jordan is the intertwining of longstanding and broad ranging social and 
political grievances, particularly those pertaining to water availability, and that the 
humanitarian relief is targeted at the Syrian refugees.  
The first structural issue that NGOs in Jordan must deal with is what the state 
views as its legal obligations to the refugees. Jordan is not a signatory of the 1951 UN 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, nor the follow-on 1967 protocol.156 The 
only agreement the Jordanian government has with the UNHCR is a 1998 memorandum 
of understanding, which specifically outlines the state’s policies to all non-Palestinian 
refugees.157 This agreement, while a step in the right direction, has no legal basis to hold 
Jordan accountable for its policies toward refugees within its borders.158 In essence, it 
depicts the best-case scenario for Jordanian refugee policy to provide any type of aid 
from those fleeing persecution in their home country. The lack of a legally binding 
agreement and recent decisions to curtail services provided to Syrians, combined with 
attempts at controlling their movement by confining refugees to camps, has severely 
strained the relationship between the UNHCR and the Jordanian government.159  
The next structural issue that NGOs must face when operating in Jordan is the 
newly proposed laws that make establishing local NGO aid organizations in Jordan 
significantly more difficult. In addition, they will add more administrative red tape for 
local and international NGOs in accepting donations. The International Center for Not-
for-Profit Law outlines the challenges:  
The draft, if enacted, will significantly restrict the legal environment for 
NGOs in Jordan, among other constraints, the draft requires at least 50 
founders to establish an NGO, provides the government with broad 
discretion to dissolve an NGO, imposes new requirements on branch 
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offices of international NGOs, and places new restrictions on the foreign 
funding of Jordanian NGOs.160  
Whether or not these proposed changes are legislated, there is a clear political 
undercurrent that seeks to restrict the actions of NGOs within Jordan, which would 
ultimately detract from the aid received by refugees.  
Evidence of the Jordanian government’s waning hospitality is abundantly clear 
and perhaps best exemplified by the October 2014 closing of the Syrian border.161 
Approximately 5,000 refugees were stranded in the Syrian desert while the border was 
unofficially closed. Moreover, aid agencies were prevented by Jordanian security forces 
from reaching the area of the border crossing to provide aid to Syrians stranded at the 
border. Even more concerning are the reports of refugees being turned away at the border 
before having the opportunity to register with the UNHCR. The lowest estimate claims 
45 percent of refugees have been turned away while the highest estimates claim 80 
percent.162 What is clear from the proposed changes to NGO laws within Jordan and 
actions taken along the border is that the political and economic support Jordan has 
received is insufficient to cope with the effects of the crisis.163 
Within these structural constraints, NGOs encounter serious issues delivering 
targeted aid to Syrian refugees, particularly aid pertaining to water. Many efforts to 
provide relief, specifically to refugees, have backfired and caused serious resentment 
toward both NGOs and refugees. The northern governorates are witnessing the most 
virulent reactions to the decline of resources. In Mafraq and across northern Jordan, the 
availability of water to the local population has been significantly reduced to compensate 
for the increasing population of Zataari refugee camp.164 Furthermore, since 84 percent 
of refugees do not live in camps, but are overwhelmingly located in the northern areas of 
Jordan, those communities are not only seeing their municipal water sources tapped to 
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help the refugee camp, but the refugees are also directly drawing from their community 
resources.165 
Further compounding the issue of water availability is the role that NGOs play in 
distorting the local market value of water in Jordan. There are many NGOs as well as 
Jordanians vying to use the municipal wells, but the NGO services are almost completely 
directed to meeting the needs of refugees. In conjunction with competing with the local 
population for water, the NGOs also face some level of competition between themselves, 
regardless of services provided. Jonathan Glennie explains that 
the constant competition between NGOs for a limited pot of resources is 
most easily seen in applications for grand money from the major donors. 
Explicitly competitive tenders attract bids from dozens of NGOs, only one 
or two will get anything.166  
The end result is that NGOs willing and able to pay more can purchase more water and 
provide aid to larger numbers of refugees. However, the consequence is that by 
overpaying for water from a local source, some NGOs have priced water above what 
Jordanians are able to afford. This feeds into the perception that Jordanians are 
overlooked while all of the state’s resources are directed at the refugees.167 
Situations like these perpetuate the perception that Syrians are given an unlimited 
amount of Jordanian water to use, whereas many of the poor communities hosting 
refugees or communities close to Zataari have lived in water stressed conditions for many 
years. These water issues play into other refugee tensions, such as increasing housing 
costs, cheap labor flooding the workforce, and clashing cultures between the refugees and 
the host communities. The unfortunate consequence is that many Jordanians are feeling 
significant effects from the refugees; therefore, they have less sympathy for the 
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humanitarian needs of the Syrians because their own situation is rapidly deteriorating, 
especially among the more impoverished host communities.168  
The tensions have escalated to the point that at least one isolated attack against an 
NGO providing aid strictly to refugees has occurred. Several aspects of the attack 
demonstrate how the deep the divisions have become between Jordanians, refugees, and 
NGOs. Perhaps even more concerning is the type of organization attacked by local 
Jordanians. Warehouses owned by the Islamic Society were attacked by young Jordanian 
men in 2012 because the aid provided by this NGO is directed completely toward Syrian 
refugees. Perhaps even more critical is that this NGO is indigenous to Jordan and is an 
outwardly Muslim organization. The attack against the Islamic Society NGO underscores 
the breakdowns within Jordanian society due to the lack of resources. Alexandra Francis 
describes a government that is 
stretched beyond its capacity to deliver essential services like healthcare, 
education, and waste management in the municipalities most affected by 
the Syrian refugee crisis…Jordanian citizens place increasing blame not 
just on Syrian refugees but also on the government for service delivery 
failures.169  
The severity of the problem reached a peak in 2013 when a small village in northern 
Jordan actually ran out of water. A wave of protests began and eventually led to the 
blocking of a major highway by the residents demanding water at decent prices. The 
protests resulted in a personal appearance from King Abdullah II with vows to rectify the 
problem, which diffused the demonstrations.170 
When coupled with more frequent protests for water, the increased level of 
vigilantism displayed by the Jordanian citizens presents another challenge for the 
kingdom. Mercy Corps initiatives to dig new pipelines have been targeted by groups of 
armed Jordanians because of the false perception that the projects will divert water away 
from local communities to refugees. In addition, death threats against those working on 
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the projects are common, as are hasty negotiations with officials from the water utility 
promising priority to the assailant’s village or neighborhood. The likelihood of actual 
changes to the local water infrastructure to benefit these armed groups is extremely small, 
which means officials are simply bargaining for more time to complete their projects, 
similar to the king’s methods for ending protests for water in northern Jordan.171  
Another source of political contention threatening Jordan is how the increased 
competition for resources and water due to the Syrian refugee crisis has inflamed political 
divides among Jordanians.172 Some of the most powerful stakeholders in Jordanian 
society are rural landowners and elites who have been a traditional source of support for 
the monarchy. Most of the rural support for the king is a result of preferential treatment 
for resources, and an important one is water.173 With the growing presence of NGOs in 
the state purchasing water above market value prices and delivering it to the Syrians, 
rural landowners are experiencing fierce competition for the remaining resources and 
disenfranchisement from the state. The Jordanian government is not only facing a 
humanitarian crisis, which is expediting a water crisis, but also a legitimacy crisis. This, 
in conjunction with the state’s inability to meet the needs of both destitute Jordanians and 
Syrian refugees, presents a dire vision of the future.174 
Destabilizing divisions among society are not limited only to Jordanians. Distinct 
societal rifts, some in relation to water, are starting to become prevalent within the Syrian 
refugee population, which has the potential to create another non-traditional security 
threat for Jordan if order cannot be maintained within a large swath of the population 
residing on Jordanian land. Traditional family roles are changing in the refugee 
population; this has sparked an increase in gender-based violence between Syrians and 
Jordanians as well.175 These issues certainly have the capability deteriorate the 
humanitarian crisis, spread social unrest, and potentially lead to violence in Jordan. 
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Water plays a critical role in defining gender roles in Syrian culture. Women are 
traditionally viewed as the keepers of the home and are subsequently responsible for 
managing many of the resources needed to sustain a family and a functioning household. 
These culturally defined roles are no longer feasible due to the severe water shortage in 
Jordan. Despite the severity of the water shortages in Jordan, which effect citizens and 
refugees alike, if a refugee household runs out of water, it is still often viewed as the fault 
of the women of the family. Since this cultural perception of water as the responsibility of 
women is prevalent, the lack of available water to refugees has been linked to increasing 
domestic violence levels in refugee communities inside and outside of camps.176  
Syrian refugees living in host communities, specifically, have several other 
factors to contend with that are degrading the fabric holding their society together. Since 
the opening of Zataari refugee camp, the overwhelming majority of aid is focused at the 
refugees living in the confines of that camp. Aid directed at those refugees living in host 
communities has declined significantly, whether deliveries of food, water, or other 
necessary supplies. The declining availability of aid for refugees living in host 
communities has a dramatic effect on households, and women in particular, because that 
support is necessary to maintain the norms of Syrian family life. With only a fraction of 
the aid available to refugees living outside camps, familial and cultural divisions will 
potentially escalate, further destabilizing a growing population within Jordan.177 
Less refugee aid for those living in host communities has also exacerbated 
tensions between Syrians and Jordanians, which has been detrimental to societal norms 
and has made maintaining order more difficult in Jordan. In addition to attacks on NGOs 
providing services for refugees and infrastructure projects perceived only to benefit 
Syrians, harassment directed at refugees is becoming more common in host 
communities.178 Harassment is frequently directed at women and girls while out in 
public. Unfortunately, they are often forced into these situations because of basic need for 
water. Many Jordanian landlords refuse Syrians access to water infrastructure on their 
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property; however, in Syrian culture women are still viewed as responsible for water and 
other basic resources in the home. The situation is sufficiently bad to garner the attention 
of the deputy governor of Mafraq. In a recent interview with Mercy Corps, he postulated 
that there is a distinct lack of respect between host communities and Syrians and that he 
anticipates the severity of harassment to increase, further isolating they Syrian 
community in Jordan.179   
The implications of societal breakdowns among Syrians have potentially far-
reaching effects throughout Jordan. Most of the international attention and support is 
directed at those refugees living within the confines of a camp; however, as the situation 
continues to worsen for those in host communities, there is the potential to scrutinize 
actions of Jordan toward a particular subset of refugees. Moreover, this would place the 
Jordanian government in a precarious position between the international community and 
the Jordanian population. As resentment aimed at refugees builds in Jordan, more severe 
actions directed at refugees will likely take place. This will put the Jordanian government 
at odds with not only the UNHCR, but also with the entire community of international 
donors seeking to help the refugees, creating an untenable situation in which the 
government will essentially have to make a choice whether to appease the international or 
local community. 
Perhaps an even greater threat to Jordan is the potential for increasing 
radicalization among the refugee population galvanized by issues surrounding water. 
Mercy Corps discovered that one of the most powerful motivating factors cited by those 
leaving Jordan to fight in Syria are reports of heinous crimes committed against Sunni 
women.180 Though this example pertains to Jordanians leaving to fight in Syria, there is 
significant potential for this same effect to happen in Syrian refugee communities in 
Jordan since it is anticipated that harassment of Syrian women in Jordan will continue to 
escalate. These issues play into the larger threat to legitimacy facing the Jordanian 
government. The inability to stop the targeting of Syrian women by Jordanians and 
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further damaging cultural norms may have potentially radicalizing effects on the Syrian 
refugee population, all of which is linked to the inability of the state to provide basic 
resources to the population. 
The Syrian refugee crisis and its impact on water in Jordan is a significant non-
traditional security threat to the state. The infrastructure is stretched beyond capacity and 
can no longer provide adequate services to refugees or citizens. NGOs are providing aid 
targeted at the refugees, but they are largely neglecting the already water scarce Jordanian 
population, which creates subsequent problems within Jordanian society. These have led 
to serious political problems for the government to rectify; however, the government has 
primarily engaged in delaying tactics with no sustainable solutions in sight. The end 
result is a serious degradation of the societal norms holding Syrian families together, 
norms largely revolving around basic household resources, such as water. The 
government of Jordan runs the risk of lacking legitimacy in the eyes of refugees, 
Jordanians, and the greater international community if constructive solutions are 
implemented in a timely fashion. Perhaps the greater challenge for the Jordanian state in 
dealing with the Syrian refugees is to prevent the same scenario that has occurred in Syria 





The lack of water availability in Lebanon and Jordan is a vital non-traditional 
security threat compounded by the presence of large refugee populations in both 
countries. This threat has existed for many years in both states, but the Syrian refugee 
crisis brings the issue of water availability to the forefront. Despite the knowledge that 
water availability is a critical problem, the management and governance of this resource 
has lagged behind in terms of the development of effective water policies and robust 
national infrastructure. There are many similarities to be drawn between Lebanon and 
Jordan as to why there is limited development, but the differences between the two 
exemplify the long-term consequences for both states. 
The critical issue facing Lebanon’s inadequate infrastructure and management is 
one of resources. The state simply does not have the capital to pay for large-scale 
infrastructure projects or substantial improvements to the network as it exists today. The 
root of this issue dates back to Ottoman law that defines water as a public good, which 
effectively has negated the Lebanese government’s efforts to privatize the water sector 
and earn revenue off the delivery of services to the people. The lack of revenue generated 
in the water sector has stifled further private investment and the government is unwilling 
to fund major projects because of their inability to turn a profit; therefore, the water 
sector will continue to deteriorate, especially due to the increasing strain on resources due 
to the large refugee population in Lebanon. 
Another aspect negatively affecting Lebanon’s water sector is the deflection of 
responsibility for water availability by the state due to the Israeli invasion in 1982. The 
occupation of southern Lebanon following the war led to the development of the water 
divergence theory, which proffers that Israel was diverting a substantial amount of water 
from the Yarmouk River back into Israeli territory. Furthermore, there are many 
conflicting reports from both Israeli and Lebanese government sources that make 
determining the validity of the claim nearly impossible. Despite the lack of consensus 
around the evidence, it provides a clear political opening for the Lebanese government to 
abdicate some responsibility for the state of water availability. Also, discussion of the 
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theory by government officials continue to give it legitimacy and keep it in the public 
consciousness, which helps to maintain the perception that the current situation is not the 
fault of the Lebanese government but the result of external influence.  
The end result of the lack of government accountability for providing clean water 
is that both Lebanese and refugees lack clean water and sanitation, particularly in key 
host communities. Moreover, skin diseases and waterborne illnesses are on the rise in the 
most concentrated refugee communities. The potential for disease to spread is a 
significant threat to not only the refugees but also to these communities. Given a large 
enough outbreak of disease, societal norms could continue to break down in host 
communities, which would create more animosity between Lebanese and refugees. 
Coupled with the government’s inability to provide clean water, the outbreak of disease 
could further delegitimize the role of government, since it would not have the capacity to 
combat a widespread health hazard. 
The Lebanese government has limited capacity to rectify such significant 
challenges of water availability and quality throughout the state, since it has minimal 
resources to direct at the problem. Due to this, the burden for allocating resources often 
falls on local communities, NGOs, and non-state actors, such as Hezbollah. The inability 
of the government to aid the citizens may seriously decrease its legitimacy for the people 
of Lebanon and also the Syrian refugees. Furthermore, the potential for sectarian violence 
has dramatically increased because the balance of sects within Lebanon has shifted 
toward the Sunni and away from the Shi’a plurality, which had existed prior to the 
refugee crisis. Deteriorating relations between host communities and refugees may foster 
increased radicalization among the more desperate refugees, especially those residing in 
southern Lebanon because that is primarily Hezbollah controlled territory. 
In Jordan, the issue of water availability is closely linked to political clout for 
rural elites, the most steadfast supporters of the king. These landed elites are able to use 
immense amounts of water for economically inefficient agricultural endeavors without 
paying a fraction of the cost that normal Jordanian citizens would face. Essentially, the 
government ensures support by not enforcing the water rationing or taxation policies on 
this political bloc. Furthermore, the Jordanian people have lived with water rationing for 
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decades, despite the financing of several mega-projects designed to drastically increase 
water availability throughout the kingdom. The end result is that the selective 
enforcement of water policy by the Jordanian government leaves no effective framework 
for the regulation of water throughout the state, including for citizens and refugees. This 
schizophrenic state of water policy enforcement in Jordan indicates a sense of denial 
about the severity of the crisis facing the state; significant revenues that could be used to 
improve water delivery throughout the state are not collected in order to maintain the 
political status quo. 
Another factor affecting the management of water in Jordan is the 1994 peace 
treaty with Israel. One of the main issues addressed in the treaty is the equitable usage of 
water from sources shared between Jordan and Israel. Though this agreement was framed 
as a great victory for Jordan, the reality of the treaty is that few agreements were actually 
made and the majority of the treaty involved vague metrics that did not set limits on 
extraction. No enforcement mechanisms were created to change the status quo and 
balance the amount of water used by both Israel and Jordan, making the agreement 
toothless. 
The situation facing Jordan is unsustainable in the long term, yet there is minimal 
political will for significant change to the current state of affairs in the water sector. For 
meaningful reform to take place, the rural elites would have to succumb to the same 
water rationing and taxation as the regular population; this would have a significant 
financial impact on their agricultural operations. The treaty of 1994 would have to be 
revisited by Jordan and Israel to create real mechanisms to ensure resource sharing is 
equitable. Each of these steps would require the king to expend significant political 
capital, not only with the rural landowners, but also with a neighboring state that has no 
will to change the current agreement in any way. 
The current perception of refugees in Jordan has shifted from a group of people 
requiring help to a group of people draining the state of precious few resources. 
Increasingly hostile actions, mostly from young Jordanian men, are directed at the 
refugees. Syrian women are frequently the target of these actions and their public 
harassment is creating familial tensions within refugee communities. Since Syrian 
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women are traditionally the managers of family resources like food and water, the actions 
of Jordanians aimed at them has restricted their ability to access water for their families. 
In turn, this has contributed to an increase in domestic violence rates among refugees in 
Jordan. Furthermore, as the societal norms in refugee communities break down, the 
potential for radicalization may increase, causing yet another threat for the rule of law in 
Jordan. 
Another aspect of the refugee crisis that threatens Jordan is that citizens are taking 
matters into their own hands, which delegitimizes the government’s role in providing 
public services and security to the population. Young men have attacked Jordanian-based 
Islamic NGOs providing aid to refugees in an effort to stop the delivery of services. 
State-run infrastructure projects have also been the target of hostile actions from 
Jordanian citizens. Because they are largely seen as projects to help only the refugees, 
groups of armed men have interrupted work on new water pipelines and have only 
allowed work to continue if the workers promise to help their local villages as well. 
Furthermore, the lack of water has led to protests that have shut down major roads and 
highways, which have resulted in direct intervention by the king for resolution. 
Unfortunately, the promises made are most likely delaying tactics to placate the 
population until another crisis arises. 
Both Lebanon and Jordan have many similarities and several key differences that 
create differing prospects for the future of both states. Water is viewed as a public good 
in Lebanon, regardless of citizenship, and this has precluded effective development of 
water infrastructure because of its lack of profitability. Jordan does not view water as a 
public good, but it selectively chooses to enforce revenue collection for citizens who are 
not members of the political power base. Both states have limited finances to 
dramatically develop their water sectors, yet Jordan has chosen to finance several mega-
projects, albeit with minimal impact, to create the appearance of proactive solutions to 
the inevitable water crisis looming in the future. Finally, the capacity of the state is 
perhaps the most critical aspect in dealing with the refugee crisis and water availability. 
Lebanon’s government has almost no capacity to handle the needs of refugees or its 
citizens, but non-state actors and local networks have largely filled those roles. Political 
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chaos is the norm in Lebanon and the refugees are simply another challenge for the 
Lebanese people to overcome to achieve stability. In Jordan, the government is losing its 
grasp on the situation, which may delegitimize state institutions. Since the capacity is 
higher in Jordan to cope with the refugees, the state has much more to lose in the eyes its 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 59 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Abouzeid, Rania. “Jordan’s Rural Chafe under the Burden of Hosting Syrian Refugees.” 
Al Jazeera, October 21, 2013. 
http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/10/21/jordana-s-rural-
poorchafeundertheburdenofhostingsyrianrefugees.html.  
Al-Harahsheh, Sura, Rida Al-Adamat, Seraj Abdullah. “The Impact of Za’atari Refugee 
Camp on the Water Quality in Amman-Zarqa Basin.” Journal of Environmental 
Protection 6, no. 1 (2015): 16–24. 
http://file.scirp.org/pdf/JEP_2015011510265820.pdf.  
Allan, John A. “Hydro-peace in the Middle East: Why No Water Wars?: A Case Study of 
the Jordan River Basin.” SAIS Review 22, no. 2 (2002): 255–272. 
https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v022/22.2allan.html.  
Allan, John A., and Tony Allan. The Middle East Water Question: Hydropolitics and the 
Global Economy. London: I. B. Tauris & Co, 2001.  
Amery, Hussein A. “A Popular Theory of Water Diversion from Lebanon: Toward Public 
Participation for Peace.” In Water in the Middle East: A Geography of Peace, 
edited by Hussein A. Amery and Aaron T. Wolf, 121–149. Austin, TX: 
University of Texas Press, 2010.  
Catafago, Selim. “Restructuring Water Sector in Lebanon: Litani River Authority-Facing 
the Challenges of Good Water Governance.” In Food Security under Water 
Scarcity in Méditerranéennes: Série A. Séminaires Méditerranéens, edited by 
Rosella Monti, 75–93. Paris: CIHEAM, 2005. 
https://om.ciheam.org/om/pdf/a65/05002197.pdf.  
Chartres, Colin, Mark Giordano, and Samyuktha Varma. “Water: A Free Public Good or 
a Market Commodity?” Global Water Forum. Last updated September 20, 2010. 
http://www.globalwaterforum.org/2010/09/20/water-a-free-public-good-or-a-
market-commodity/.  
Darwish, T., T. Atallah, M. El Moujabber, and N. Khatib. “Salinity Evolution and Crop 
Response to Secondary Soil Salinity in Two Agro-climatic Zones in Lebanon.” 
Agricultural Water Management 78, no. 1 (2005): 152–164. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378377405002337152.  
Gebeily, Maya, and James Haines-Young. “High and Dry: Syrian Refugees Have Been 
Severely Affected by the Water Shortages.” Executive. October 30, 2014. 
http://www.executive-magazine.com/economics-policy/water-high-and-dry.  
 60 
Glennie, Jonathan. “NGOs Need a Third Way: Collaboration.” Poverty Matters Blog, 
March 13, 2012. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-
matters/2012/mar/13/ngos-need-third-way-collaboration.  
Greenwood, Scott. “Water Insecurity, Climate Change and Governance in the Arab 
World.” Middle East Policy 21, no. 2 (2014): 140–156. 
http://mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/water-insecurity-climate-
change-and-governance-arab-world.   
Gluck, Caroline. “Syrian Refugee Influx Adding to Jordan’s Water Worries.” OXFAM 
Canada. Accessed October 12, 2015. http://www.oxfam.ca/blogs/conflict-
emergencies/refugee-influx-adding-to-jordans-water-worries.  
Fischhendler, Itay. “Ambiguity in Transboundary Environmental Dispute Resolution: 
The Israeli—Jordanian Water Agreement.” Journal of Peace Research 45, no. 1 
(2008): 91–109.  
Francis, Alexandra. Jordan’s Refugee Crisis. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 2015. http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/09/21/jordan-s-
refugee-crisis/ihwc.  
Heslot, Soazic. “Jordan’s Food and Water Security.” Future Directions International. 
September 11, 2014. http://www.futuredirections.org.au/publications/food-and-
water-crises/1939-jordan-s-food-and-water-security.html.  
Jacobsen, Karen. “Can Refugees Benefit the State? Refugee Resources and African 
Statebuilding.” Journal of Modern African Studies 40, no. 4 (2002): 577–596.  
Khatib, Ahmad. “Syrian Refugees Draining Water-poor Jordan Dry.” Daily Star, June 1, 
2012. http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Middle-East/2012/Jun-01/175355-
syrian-refugees-draining-water-poor-jordan-dry.ashx.  
Lefèvre, Raphaël. “Tackling Sunni Radicalization in Lebanon.” Carnegie Middle East 
Center. December 24, 2014. http://carnegie-mec.org/publications/?fa=57592.  
Massoud, May A., Abdolmonim Al-Abady, Mey Jurdi, and Iman Nuwayhid. “The 
Challenges of Sustainable Access to Safe Drinking Water in Rural Areas of 
Developing Countries: Case of Zawtar El-Charkieh, Southern Lebanon.” Journal 
of Environmental Health 72 (10): 34–30.  
Mercy Corps. Analysis of Host Community-Refugee Tensions in Mafraq, Jordan. 
Portland, OR: Mercy Corps, 2012. http://www.alnap.org/resource/8676.  
———. Tapped Out: Water Scarcity and Refugee Pressures in Jordan. Portland, OR: 
Mercy Corps, 2014. https://www.mercycorps.org/research-resources/tapped-out-
water-scarcity-and-refugee-pressures-jordan.  
 61 
Michaelson, Ruth. “Refugees Pay the High Price of Lebanese Cost-cutting.” Al Jazeera, 
April 30, 2015. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/04/refugees-pay-high-price-
lebanese-cost-cutting-150412095256439.html.  
Murdock, Heather. “Water Shortages in Lebanon Devastate Syrian Refugees.” Voice of 
America, December 23, 2014. http://www.voanews.com/content/water-shortages-
lebanon-syrian-refugees/2571595.html.  
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Water Governance in 




Roberts, Adam. “Foreigners in Lebanon: Show Us Your Papers.” The Economist, August 
19, 2014. http://www.economist.com/blogs/pomegranate/2014/08/foreigners-
lebanon.  
Rogers, Peter, and Peter Lydon. “Preface.” In Water in the Arab World: Perspectives and 
Prognoses, edited by Peter Rogers and Peter Lydon, iii–v. Cambridge, MA: The 
Division of Applied Sciences, Harvard University, 1994.   
Roudi-Fahimi, Farzaneh, Liz Creel, and Roger-Mark De Souza. “Finding the Balance: 
Population and Water Scarcity in the Middle East and North Africa.” Population 
Reference Bureau, Accessed July 23, 2016. http://www.prb.org/Publications/ 
Reports/2002/FindingtheBalancePopulationandWaterScarcityintheMiddleEastand
NorthAfrica.aspx.  
Saadallaoui, Bassem. “Competing for Scarce Resources: The New Concern for Syrian 
refugees and Host Communities in Lebanon.” ENN. Accessed April 12, 2016. 
http://www.ennonline.net/fex/48/competing.  
Sadik, Abdul-Karim, and Shawki Barghouti. “Water Problems of the Arab World: 
Management of Scarce Resources.” In Water in the Arab World: Perspectives and 
Prognoses, eds. Peter Rogers and Peter Lydon, 1–37. Cambridge, MA: The 
Division of Applied Sciences, Harvard University, 1994.  
Saleh, Kamel. “Lebanon Faces Water Crisis.” Al-Monitor, March 30, 2014. 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/03/lebanon-water-poverty-line-
crisis.html#.  
Schenker, David. “Syria’s Good Neighbors: How Jordan and Lebanon Sheltered Millions 




Schwartzstein, Peter. “Syrian Refugees in Lebanon Camp Reliant on ‘Hell Water’ that 
Reduces Metal to Rust.” The Guardian, May 26, 2015. 
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/may/26/syrian-refugees-
lebanon-shatila-camp-hell-water.  
Shaban, Amin. “Indicators and Aspects of Hydrological Drought in Lebanon.” Water 
Resources Management 23, no. 10 (2009): 1875–1891.  
Shapland, Greg. Rivers of Discord. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997.  
Siddiqi, Afreen, and Laura Diaz Anadon. “The Water-Energy Nexus in Middle East and 
North Africa.” Energy Policy 39, no. 8 (2011): 4529–4540. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421511003065.  
Silverman, Amanda. “Global Thinkers: Why Water Is a Fundamental National Security 
Issue.” Global Thinkers. Foreign Policy Online. November 3, 2015. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/03/global-thinkers-why-water-is-a-fundamental-
national-security-issue/.  
Starr, Joyce R. “Water Wars.” Foreign Policy, no. 82 (Spring 1991): 17–36. doi: 
10.2307/1148639.  
Suleiman, Rebhieh, Lisa Van Well and Jan-Erik Gustafsson. “Governance of the Amman 
Water Utility.” Development in Practice 18, no. 1 (2008): 53–65. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27751875.  
Sweis, Rana F. “No Syrians Are Allowed into Jordan, Agencies Say.” New York Times, 




United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. Guidebook on Promoting Good 
Governance in Public-Private Partnerships. Geneva: United Nations, 2008. 
http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/ceci/publications/ppp.pdf.  
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Support to Lebanese Host 
Communities and Public Institutions: Under the Sixth Regional Response Plan 
(RRP6-2014). New York: UNHCR, 2014.  
———. WASH Assessment of Syrian Refugee Households in Akkar Governorate. New 




Vengosh, Avner, and Eliahu Rosenthal. “Saline Groundwater in Israel: Its Bearing on the 
Water Crisis in the Country.” Journal of Hydrology 156, no. 1 (1994): 389–430. 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0022169494900876.  
Wang, Yizhou. Defining Non-traditional Security and Its Implications for China. Beijing: 
Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 
2004. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.472.3779 
&rep=rep1&type=pdf.  
Warrick, Joby. “Influx of Syrian Refugees Stretches Jordan’s Water Resources even 




Yamout, Ghina, and Dima Jamali. “A Critical Assessment of a Proposed Public Private 
Partnership (PPP) for the Management of Water Services in Lebanon.” Water 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 65 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
